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PREVENTING SEX-OFFENDER RECIDIVISM THROUGH
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPROACHES AND
SPECIALIZED COMMUNITY INTEGRATION
by HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO
MICHAEL L. PERLIN
ABSTRACT
'The public's panic about the fear of recidivism if adjudicated sex
offenders are ever to be released to the community has not subsided, despite
the growing amount of information and statistically-reliable data signifying
a generally low risk of re-offense. The established case law upholding sex-
offender civil commitment and containment statutes has generally rejected
challenges of unconstitutionality, and continues to be dominated by
punitive undertones. We have come to learn that the tools used to assess
offenders for risk and civil commitment still have indeterminate accuracy,
and that meaningful treatment for this population remains uncertain in its
availability and debatable as to its effectiveness. Yet, society continues to
clamor for legislation confining this cohort of offenders for treatment, and,
ostensibly, protection of the community. Legislatures tend to respond
quickly to these calls. This reform legislation often includes strict and
demeaning post-release restrictions that track offenders and undermine their
integration into society. These reforms continue to show no benefit either to
the public or to the individual offender. The absence of meaningful and
effective treatment during confinement, combined with inhumane
conditions upon release, make it far less likely that this cohort of
individuals will ever become productive members of society. Only through
therapeutic jurisprudence, a focus on rehabilitation, and the humane
treatment of individuals who have committed sexual offenses will it be
possible to reduce recidivism and facilitate successful community
reintegration.
This article takes a new approach to these issues. It examines sex-
offender laws past and present, looks at sex-offender commitment and
containment through a therapeutic jurisprudence lens, and suggests basic
policy changes that would optimally and constitutionally minimize re-
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[]
offense rates, while upholding and protecting the rights of all citizens. This
article highlights the failure of community containment laws and ordinances
by focusing on (1) the myths and perceptions that have arisen about sex
offenders, and how society codifies those myths in legislation, (2) the lack
of rehabilitation offered to incarcerated or civilly committed offenders,
which results in inadequate re-entry preparation, (3) the anti-therapeutic and
inhumane effect of the laws and ordinances created to restrict sex offenders
in the community, and (4) the reluctance and resistance of courts to
incorporate therapeutic jurisprudence in seeking to remediate this set of
circumstances. It concludes by offering some modest suggestions, based on
the adoption of a therapeutic jurisprudence model of analysis.
INTRODUCTION
Individuals who have committed sex offenses have taken center stage
in both the criminal and civil legal systems.2 Currently, no other population
is more despised, more vilified, more subject to media misrepresentation,3
and more likely to be denied basic human rights.4 Endless emotionally
charged debates have ensued, focusing on how to ostensibly maintain safety
in local communities while containing the "sexual predator."'
Unfortunately, most of these debates are premised upon incorrect facts and
spurious data that have been distorted and skewed to support political
agendas that respond to---or perhaps in some cases, incite-community
outcries for retribution.'
2. See Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 435, 436-38 (2010) (discussing the current political emphasis on punishing sex offenders).
3. E.g., Chris Greer, News Media, Victims and Crime, in VICTIMS, CRIME AND SOCIETY 20, 40-41
(Pamela Davies, Peter Francis & Chris Greer eds., 2007) (discussing sensationalization of sex crimes in
the media).
4. See Hollida Wakefield, The Vilification of Sex Offenders: Do Laws Targeting Sex Offenders
Increase Recidivism and Sexual Violence?, I J. SEXUAL OFFENDER CIV. COMMITMENT: SC. & L. 141,
141-49 (2006), available at http://ccoso.org/Vilification.pdf (examining the potential harmful effects of
the current policies regarding sex offenders and emphasizing the lack of evidentiary support for these
policies). See Adam Deming, Sex Offender Civil Commitment Programs: Current Practices,
Characteristics, and Resident Demographics, 36 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 439, 440 (2008) (noting that
typical civil commitment schemes are found to violate civil rights, but when applied to sex offenders,
these statutes are typically upheld).
5. Public outcry has led to a continual increase in restrictions on sex offenders who are out of
custody, despite a lack of evidence that these laws are effective. See Ian Lovett, Public-Place Laws
Tighten Rein on Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.comi/2012/05/30/us/sex-
offenders-face-growing-restrictions-on-public-places.html (explaining that sex offenders are banned
from public parks in Orange County, Cal.); Abby Sewell, Halloween Night Restrictions are Added for
Sex Offenders, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/20/llnov/01/local/la-me-
halloween-offenders-201 11101 (explaining that sex offenders are subjected to restrictions on Halloween
celebrations in Los Angeles, Cal.); Megan Twohey, Sex Offender Housing Restrictions May Lead to
More Crimes, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 9, 2010, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-04-09/news/ct-met-sex-
offender-housing-20100408_offenders-parole-housing-restrictions (explaining that housing
restrictions for sex offenders in Chicago, Ill. may in fact place the public at a greater risk).
6. See Michelle Meloy et al., Sex Offender Laws in America: Can Panic-Driven Legislation Ever
Create Safer Societies?, 20 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 423, 424-28 (2007) (discussing state and federal
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State and federal legislators have addressed society's fear and outrage
by enacting statutes that keep such offenders locked up indefinitely., If
there is to be eventual release, such offenders are subjected to strict
monitoring upon return to the community.' Sex-offender civil commitment
and community containment laws were developed as reactionary responses
to the widely feared but statistically rare, violent, child-directed and
stranger-perpetrated sex crime.9
Under the prevailing statutory schemes'so-many of which have been
patterned after the statute upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
Kansas v. Hendricks' '-individuals who have committed sexual offenses or
certain qualifying offenses deemed to have a sexual component 2 may be
responses to the sex offender panic and noting that many of the most popular methods of dealing with
sex offenders-community notification and civil commitment-are not evidence-based responses to the
problem and have yet to be proven effective).
7. E.g., Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995) (noting that continued confinement of
a person committed as a "psychopathic personality" under a Minnesota statute is justified if the
confinement bears a reasonable relation to the original reason for commitment).
8. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.096 (West 2009) (providing that, upon release from civil
commitment, persons may be subjected to residency restrictions, prohibition of alcohol and drug use,
and extensive monitoring that may include a satellite-based navigation system incorporating a global
positioning system (GPS)).
9. See Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., The Function of Punishment in the "Civil" Commitment of
Sexually Violent Predators, 25 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 437, 445-47 (2007) (considering the retributive
motivations for sexually violent predator ("SVP") commitment); see also Leonore M. J, Simon,
Matching Legal Policies with Known Offenders, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS
OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, & THERAPY 149, 149 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. La Fond eds., 2003)
[hereinafter PROTECTING SOCIETY] (citations omitted) ("Legal policies targeting sex offenders are
appearing in an increasing number of states and on the federal level. These policies often result from
widely publicized heinous sex crimes committed by stranger offenders. Washington State, for example,
enacted its community notification legislation after a 7-year-old boy was raped and mutilated by a
convicted sex offender. . . . [T]he resulting legislation was designed to protect children from strangers.
Such legislation, however, promotes 'a false sense of security, lulling parents and children into the big-
bad-man mindset when many molesters are in fact trusted authority figures or family members."').
10. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a et seq. (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09 et seq. (West
2009); see also Wanda D. Beyer Kendall & Monit Cheung, Sexually Violent Predators And Civil
Commitment Laws, 13 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 41, 48-52 (2008) (noting that sixteen states have
involuntary civil commitment laws that provide for continuous confinement of SVPs).
I1. 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upholding Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act).
12. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020 (15) (West 2009) ("'Sexually violent offense' means
an act committed on, before, or after July 1, 1990, that is: (a) An act defined in Title 9A RCW as rape in
the first degree, rape in the second degree by forcible compulsion, rape of a child in the first or second
degree, statutory rape in the first or second degree, indecent liberties by forcible compulsion, indecent
liberties against a child under age fourteen, incest against a child under age fourteen, or child
molestation in the first or second degree; (b) a felony offense in effect at any time prior to July 1, 1990,
that is comparable to a sexually violent offense as defined in (a) this subsection, or any federal or out-of-
state conviction for a felony offense that under the laws of this state would be a sexually violent offense
as defined in this subsection; (c) an act of murder in the first or second degree, assault in the first or
second degree, assault of a child in the first or second degree, kidnapping in the first or second degree,
burglary in the first degree, residential burglary, or unlawful imprisonment, which act, either at the time
of sentencing for the offense or subsequently during civil commitment proceedings pursuant to this
chapter, has been determined beyond a reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated, as that term is
defined in RCW 9.94A.030; or (d) an act as described in chapter 9A.28 RCW, that is an attempt,
criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy to commit one of the felonies designated in (a), (b), or (c) of
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civilly committed for care and "treatment" at the conclusion of their prison
sentence." Such a civil commitment, although originally intended to apply
only to the most heinous and dangerous offenders, has become a widely-
used tool, designed to contain large numbers of offenders whether or not
their sexually motivated crimes were severe or frequent.14 Only and if the
risk to re-offend is perceived to be sufficiently reduced, are committed
offenders considered for release back into the community." Upon release,
individuals are subjected to community containment laws that impose strict
conditions on place of residence, type of employment, and freedom of
movement, which often include intensive and intrusive monitoring.'" The
state and federal governments' enactment of registration and notification
statutes has widened the net over vast numbers of individuals who have
committed a wide range of offenses, sexually-motivated or otherwise."
this subsection.").
13. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (providing for post-prison civil commitment of SVPs).
For a discussion on effective (and ineffective) methods of treatment for sex offenders and sexual
predators, see Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 505 (1998) (discussing effective and ineffective methods of treatment for
sex offenders and sexual predators).
14. This broad application flies in the face of the Supreme Court's mandate in upholding these
statutes, noting that they only apply to a narrow class of individuals. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 364; see,
e.g., OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR: STATE OF MINN., CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS
(Mar. 2011), available at http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/2011/ccsosum.htm ("The number of
civilly committed sex offenders in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) nearly quadrupled
during the last decade and is expected to nearly double over the next ten years."); see also W. VA.
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR MGMT. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, 9 (2007), available at
http://www.wvpds.org/SVP%20report-%2OFinal%20-6-30-2007.pdf [hereinafter WEST VIRGINIA
REPORT] ("The qualifying offense feature of the definition is narrow in scope, creating gaps for high risk
offenders to slip past. On the other hand, the mental abnormality component of the definition is too broad in
scope, allowing inappropriate offenders to be channeled through the screening process.").
15. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 71.09.090 (West 2009) ("(1) If the secretary determines that the
person's condition has so changed that either: (a) The person no longer meets the definition of a sexually
violent predator; or (b) conditional release to a less restrictive alternative is in the best interest of the
person and conditions can be imposed that adequately protect the community, the secretary shall
authorize the person to petition the court for conditional release to a less restrictive alternative or
unconditional discharge."). But see, e.g., In re Senty-Haugen, 583 N.W.2d 266, 268 (Minn. 1998)
("[U]nlike commitment procedures for persons with mental illness, mental retardation or chemical
dependency, Minn. Stat. § 253B.185, governing SPP/SDP commitments, simply does not require that
such commitments be made to the least restrictive treatment program.").
16. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 71.09.096 (West 2009) ("(4) Prior to authorizing any release to
a less restrictive alternative, the court shall impose such conditions upon the person as are necessary to
ensure the safety of the community. The court shall order the department of corrections to investigate
the less restrictive alternative and recommend any additional conditions to the court. These conditions
shall include, but are not limited to the following: Specification of residence, prohibition of contact with
potential or past victims, prohibition of alcohol and other drug use, participation in a specific course of
inpatient or outpatient treatment that may include monitoring by the use of polygraph and
plethysmograph, monitoring through the use of global positioning satellite technology, supervision by a
department of corrections community corrections officer, a requirement that the person remain within
the state unless the person receives prior authorization by the court, and any other conditions that the
court determines are in the best interest of the person or others. A copy of the conditions of release shall
be given to the person and to any designated service providers.").
17. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 780 N.W.2d 90, 105-06 (Wis. 2010) (finding that a seventeen-year-old
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Ironically and sadly, it has been empirically shown that these laws do little
to protect the public.'" Instead, they have been proven to ostracize, isolate,
and destroy any hope of re-integration for convicted sex offenders; these
laws may even tend to increase recidivism. 9 Many are beginning to wonder
whether the increasing costs of enforcing these laws are justifiable.2 0
This paper intends to highlight the failure of community containment
laws and ordinances by focusing on (1) the myths and perceptions of sex
offenders and how society incorporates those myths into legislation, (2) the
lack of rehabilitation offered to incarcerated or civilly committed offenders
which results in inadequate re-entry preparation, (3) the anti-therapeutic and
inhumane effect of the laws and ordinances created to restrict sex offenders
in the community, and (4) the reluctance and resistance of courts to
incorporate therapeutic jurisprudence in seeking to remediate this set of
circumstances. We will conclude by offering some modest suggestions,
based on the adoption of a therapeutic jurisprudence model of analysis.
The absence of meaningful and effective treatment during confinement
combined with inhumane conditions upon release make it far less likely that
this cohort of individuals will ever become productive members of society.
Only through therapeutic jurisprudence, focus on rehabilitation, and
humane treatment of individuals who have committed sexual offenses will
it be possible to reduce recidivism and foster successful community
reintegration.
I. PERCEPTIONS OF A SEX OFFENDER EPIDEMIC
[N]othing is more threatening to our families and communities and
more destructive of our basic values than sex offenders who
victimize children and families. Study after study tell us that they
often repeat the same crimes. That's why we have to stop sex
offenders before they commit their next crime, to make our children
safe and give their parents peace of mind. 21
male convicted as a sex offender based on the crime of false imprisonment during a drug exchange was
sanctioned for failing to update the State with personal information). Under a rational basis standard, the
sex-offender registration statute was upheld as constitutional, though it required persons convicted of
non-sex crimes to register. Id.; see also Melissa Wangenheim, "To Catch a Predator, " Are We Casting
Our Nets Too Far?: Constitutional Concerns Regarding the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 62
RUTGERS L. REv. 559, 592-97 (2010)(evaluating the over-inclusiveness of civil commitment practices
and their tenacious classification as within constitutional bounds).
18. See Kristen Zgoba et al., MEGAN'S LAW: ASSESSING THE PRACTICAL AND MONETARY
EFFICACY 41, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/nij/grants/225370.pdf (examining efficacy of
Megan's Law in New Jersey and finding no reduction in re-offense rates or in the number of victims
between ten years before and ten years after the law was enacted, thus unable to determine whether the
law affects recidivism, harm reduction, or community tenure).
19. See Wakefield, supra note 4, at 141-49 (examining the potential harmful effects of the current
policies regarding sex offenders).
20. See Zgoba, supra note 18, at 39 (explaining that the costs associated with implementing
Megan's Law are growing and noting that implementation costs across the state increased from
$555,565 in 1994 to $3.9 million in 2007).
21. William J. Clinton, The President's Radio Address (Aug. 24, 1996) (transcript available at
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Political pressure is only one of the many reasons why focus on this
area of the law has expanded substantially.22 Some of the other most salient
reasons include:
* media-driven frenzies over rare yet horrific acts of sexual
violence against children;23
* an unsubstantiated belief that future recidivism is high and
most sex offenders will re-offend,2 4 a belief that is reinforced
by popular media depictions25 (such as those on the popular
TV show, Law and Order: Special Victims Unit);26
* the constraints in prosecuting sex crimes and the public's
frustration with plea bargains carrying light sentences for these
specific types of offenses;27
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.phppid=53230) (referring to community notification laws as
a way to give "parents and police ... the warning they need to protect children.").
22. See Eric S. Janus, Closing Pandora 's Box: Sexual Predators and the Politics ofSexual Violence,
34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1233, 1233-50 (2004) (discussing how the effect of politics and public outcry
fuels the expansion of sexually violent predator programs). See generally Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual
Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST. 43 (1998) (evaluating social policies regarding sexual
predators and calling for an increased focus on empirical research in the development of such policies).
23. See Michael H. Miner, Editorial: Is This Any Way to Develop Policy?, 2 SEXUAL OFFENDER
TREATMENT (2007), http://www.sexual-offender-treatment.org/54.htm (discussing the link between
isolated incidents of horrific child sexual abuse and enactment of more restrictive sex offender laws). It
must be noted that within the last few years there has been a shift in the media's presentation of sexual
crimes and legislative responses. The state of the economy (raising concerns about the exorbitant cost of
sex offender facilities) coupled with high profile cases involving otherwise respected members of the
community seem to have opened a wider dialogue in analyzing these issues with focus on the legality of
these laws and the reality of sex offender re-offense and risk. See, e.g., Erica Goode, Researchers See
Decline in Child Sexual Abuse Rate, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/us/rate-of-child-sexual-abuse-on-the-decline.html (standing for the
proposition that sexual abuse is increasingly rare); Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as
States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/us/04civil.htmi (voicing concerns about the current trend of
increased civil commitments and lack of evidentiary support for the effectiveness of this method of
dealing with sex offenders).
24. Charles H. Rose Ill, Caging the Beast: Formulating Effective Evidentiary Rules to Deal with
Sexual Offenders, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 21 (2006) (providing empirical data that shows sex offenders
are less likely to commit the same category of offense when recidivating than other categories of
offenders).
25. See, e.g., Amy Adler, To Catch a Predator, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 130, 137-45 (2011)
(analyzing the TV program "To Catch a Predator" and its effect on public policy).
26. Hal Arkowitz & Scott 0. Lilienfeld, Once a Sex Offender, Always a Sex Offender? Maybe Not,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Apr. 3, 2008),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=misunderstood-crimes ("[T]he average member of
the general public believes that 75 percent of sex offenders will reoffend. This perception is consistent
with media portrayals in such television programs as Law and Order: Special Victims Unit, in which sex
offenders are almost always portrayed as chronic repeaters.").
27. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Kennedy, J. concurring) ("If the civil system is used simply to
impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not
performing its proper function."); Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of "Sexually Violent Predators" 93
MINN. L. REv. 670, 682-83 (2008) (describing the practical incentives that may lead a sex offender to
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* the drastic increase in the availability of psychiatric and
psychological expert testimony supporting prosecutorial
applications for extended incarceration post-sentence; 28
* the creation of numerous employment opportunities for
psychologists and social workers within the civil commitment
institutions for persons committed under "Sexually Violent
Predator" (SVP) laws, 29 and
* the loosely defined SVP statutory requirements that result in
misapplication of the intent of the law and arbitrary decisions
as to which offenders and what behavior warrants civil
commitment.3 0
The programmatic goal of SVP laws was to focus society's attention on
those offenders who pose the greatest risk and likelihood of recidivism.
However, information regarding "who" fit the profile of the goal-directed
group was uncertain and inconclusive at the time the laws were initially
enacted.' In fact, valid and reliable evidence tells us that incest and familial
offenses are the most common occurrences of sexual violence.3 2 Without
choose to enter into a plea bargain in order to avoid the harsh collateral consequences of conviction at
trial); see also Carlsmith et al., supra note 9, at 445-46 (detailing a controlled study that found that
when the criminal sentence was lenient, respondents strongly supported civil commitment without
regard to future risk); Eric Hartley, Molesters Getting a Slap on the Wrist? Lack of Jail Time in Cases
Sparks Sentencing Debate, THE CAPITAL, Apr. 22, 2007, at Al I (discussing public criticism of
perceived lenient sentences for child molesters).
28. See Christine Willmsen, State Wastes Millions Helping Sex Predators Avoid Lockup, SEATTLE
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2012, http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2017301107_civilcomm22.html
(emphasizing the high cost of maintaining Washington's civil commitment program, much of which
goes to forensic psychologists who evaluate sex offenders and testify throughout the state regularly); see
also Gary Craig, Expert Opinion Among Civil Commitment's High Costs, DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (N.Y.),
Dec. 29, 2010,
http://www.democratandchronicle.com/article/20101229/NEWS0 1/12290345 (reporting how a
psychologist earned approximately $1 million over a three-year period from giving expert testimony in
sex offender civil commitment cases from Massachusetts and New York).
29. See Gary Craig, Civil Confinement of Sex Offenders Costs State $175,000 Apiece, DEMOCRAT &
CHRON. (N.Y.), Dec. 26,2010,
http://www.democratandchronicle.com/article/20101226/NEWS01/12260311 /Civil-confinement-ofsex-
offenders-costs-state-$175-000-apiece (discussing New York civil commitment costs: "At the current
rate of growth-about 70 newly confined offenders annually-treatment costs alone will grow by about
$12 million a year.").
30. See John Q. La Fond & Bruce J. Winick, Op-Ed, Doing More Than Their Time, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/21/opinion/nyregionopinions/21 Lllafond.htm
(explaining how vague and expansive definitions of civil commitment statutes allow for the confinement
of sex offenders who are not mentally disturbed or dangerous).
31. See Karol Lucken & William Bales, Florida's Sexually Violent Predator Program: An
Examination of Risk and Civil Commitment Eligibility, 54 CRIME & DEL[NQ. 95, 98 (2008) (discussing
the limited amount of empirical data available regarding SOCC risk assessment).
32. SeeLori Presser & Elaine Gunnison, Strange Bedfellows: Is Sex Offender Notification a Form of
Community Justice?, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 299, 304 (1999) (citations omitted) ("[1]n nearly 75 percent
of sexual assault and rape cases and in 90 percent of those involving children, the victim knew the
offender. Forty-three percent of victims under age twelve were assaulted by family members."); Bruce J.
Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Sex Offender Registration and Community
Notification Laws, in PROTECTING SOCIETY, supra note 9, at 213, 218 (suggesting that more than
seventy-five percent of reported cases of sexual abuse are perpetrated by someone that the child knows).
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significant consideration of sex offender prevalence and dynamics, laws
were, based off of the "stranger rapist/murderer" profile and upheld with
heavy reliance on expert opinions supporting empirical, then-current "risk
determinative" instruments and controversial science."3 The studies and
33. For an overview of the discrepancies in risk assessment, see R. Karl Hanson, Who is Dangerous
and When are They Safe? Risk Assessment with Sexual Offenders, in PROTECTING SOCIETY, supra note9,
at 63-72. See, e.g., Matter of Registrant G.B., 685 A.2d 1252, 1265-66 (N.J. 1996) (allowing a registrant
to introduce expert evidence regarding tier classification under certain circumstances); Matter of
Registrant C.A., 679 A.2d 1153, 1170-71 (N.J. 1996) (affirming the reliability of the Registrant Risk
Assessment Scale). In In re Commitment of R.S., 801 A.2d 219 (N.J. 2002), the New Jersey Supreme
Court stated:
Although there are critics who challenge the validity and predictability of actuarial
instruments in sex offender assessments, the record expert testimony and scientific literature
demonstrates that clinicians specializing in sex offender assessments generally support the
use of actuarial instruments in the overall assessment process even though they do not
support reliance on the actuarial instruments alone. . . . As the Appellate Division
summarized:
The extensive expert testimony in this matter concerning validation studies, cross-
validation studies, reliability studies, correlation coefficients, and clinically-derived
factors attests to such reliability in this context, where the actuarials are not used as
the sole or free-standing determinants for civil commitment. They are not litmus tests.
There is no requirement that the actuarial instruments be the best methods which
could ever be devised to determine risk of recidivism. What is required is that they
produce results which are reasonably reliable for their intended purpose.
Id. 220-21 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 91 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 2001).
See also, e.g., State ex rel. Romley v. Fields, 35 P.3d 82, 89 (Ariz. 2001) (concluding the Frye
expert test does not apply to actuarial models developed by mental health experts to predict likelihood of
recidivism); People v. Therrian, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 419-20 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding a Kelly hearing
regarding admissibility of expert testimony concerning defendant's likelihood of reoffending was
unnecessary since testimony was not solely based on the Static-99 test); Roeling v. State, 880 So.2d
1234, 1238-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2004) (holding that expert opinion testimony satisfied the Frye test);
In re Detention of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613, 619 (Iowa Ct. App.2002) (finding that evidence regarding
actuarial risk assessment instruments goes to the weight of evidence and is not an issue of admissibility);
In re Care & Treatment of Teer, No. 89,652, 90 P.3d 379, slip op. at 3-4 (Kan. Ct. App.2004)
(unpublished order) (finding that expert testimony concerning risk assessment tests was sufficient
evidence for jury to determine offender was a sexually violent predator); Commonwealth v. Wright, No.
032449A, 2004 WL 1690388, at *1 (Mass. Jul. 15, 2004) (stating that expert testimony established
defendant was a sexually dangerous person); In re Risk Level Determination of R.B.P., 640 N.W.2d
351, 353-57 (Minn. Ct. App.2002) (holding that based on special concerns, the End of Confinement
Review Committee has the discretion to raise an offender's risk assessment level higher than the results
from the Sex Offender Screening Tool indicate); Goddard v. State, 144 S.W.3d 848, 851-55 (Mo. Ct.
App.2004) (finding that expert testimony regarding the use of actuarial instruments was admissible);
State v. Legg, 84 P.3d 648, 653-54 (Mont. 2004) (finding the court properly considered the contents of a
pre-sentencing report, as well as other facts, in determining offender's risk level to victims and
community during sentencing); Slansky v. Nebraska State Patrol, 685 N.W.2d 335, 345-49 (Neb. 2004)
(stating that risk assessment instrument is a rationally based tool to predict recidivism); People v. Girup,
780 N.Y.S.2d 698, 699 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (mem. op.) (stating that the County Court may exercise
its discretion and depart from the recommendation of the Board to determine a sex offender's risk level
based on the record); In re D.V.A., 676 N.W.2d 776, 778-80 (N.D.2004) (holding that the trial court did
not err by admitting psychologist testimony based on risk assessment tests to determine SDP status
because psychologists generally rely on these evaluations); State v. McKinniss, 795 N.E.2d 160, 165-67
(Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (review of entire record, not solely the outcomes of psychological tests, resulted in
determination of the likelihood of future sex offenses); State v. Gibson, 66 P.3d 560, 564-68 (Or. Ct.
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statistics regarding risk of offender recidivism yielded inaccurate results
when applied to individual offenders being evaluated for the likelihood of
future re-offenses.3 4
These underlying tools that support confinement and containment
continue to be flawed," and experts drastically disagree on offender
statistics and the reliability of actuarial instruments designed to show
recidivism. 6 Despite this, there has been absolutely no movement towards
serious modification or repeal of any of these laws, even as studies are
reworked and results of earlier studies are re-evaluated, leading to the
concomitant rejection of these methods by the same scholars and
researchers responsible for pioneering the early studies and statistical
App. 2003) (finding that the existence of a mental disorder that created sufficiently impaired impulse
control was enough to conclude appellant was a "dangerous by typical recidivist" sex offender); In re
Care & Treatment of Tucker, 578 S.E.2d 719, 721-22 (S.C. 2003) (holding that a sex offender failed to
show sufficient change in his mental condition so as to warrant release); In re Commitment of Morales,
98 S.W.3d 288, 290-91 (Tex.Ct.App.2003) (finding that a serious difficulty in controlling behavior was
established by evidence from psychological tests as well as facts of case, including committing a second
sexual offense while on probation for the first and history of heavy drug use with impulsivity issues); In
re Detention of Thorell, 72 P.3d 708, 724-26 (Wash. 2003) (upholding the use of actuarial risk
assessment instruments in determining future dangerousness of sexual offenders); In re Commitment of
Tainter, 655 N.W.2d 538, 543-44 (Wis. 2002) (affirming the trial court's admittance of testimony
regarding actuarial instruments).
34. See Robin J. Wilson et al., Comparing Sexual Offenders at the Regional Treatment Centre
(Ontario) and the Florida Civil Commitment Center, INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP.
CRIMINOLOGY, 12-16 (2012), available at
http://ijo.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/01/17/0306624X 11434918 (finding that populations
designated as high risk future sexual offenders, upon release, had only between a three and ten percent
chance of re-offending); see also Karen Franklin, Treatment and Risk Among the Most Dangerous
Sexual Offenders, FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGIST, (Feb. 21, 2012),
http://forensicpsychologist.blogspot.com/2012/02/treatment-and-risk-among-most-dangerous.html
(discussing the above study).
35. See John Matthew Fabian, The Risky Business of Conducting Risk Assessments for Those
Already Civilly Committed as Sexually Violent Predators, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 81, 85-87 (2005)
(describing "the problems and pitfalls" related to sex offender civil commitment reexamination
procedures).
36. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, A Study in "Actuarial Justice:" Sex Offender Classification Practice
and Procedure, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 593, 606-19 (2000) (illustrating the different methods used by
various states to make discretionary risk assessments of sexual offenders made by courts, executive
agencies, prosecutors, judges and/or hybrid combinations of these cohorts); Larry Oakes, They're All
Close Calls Now, STAR. TRIB. (Minn.), June 9, 2008, http://www.startribune.com/local/19645554.html
(quoting psychiatrist John Austin who stated that risk assessment models "are about 70 percent accurate;
thus they're wrong 30 percent of the time"); Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, The Forensic Use of
Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1486 (2003) (discussing the superiority of actuarial risk assessments which have
been tested extensively and have broad acceptance in literature concerning sexual offending); PAUL
MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND A REVIEW OF
THE EVIDENCE 94-95 (1954) (describing a study which potentially shows actuarial superiority in
predicting criminal recidivism); Robert Prentky et al., Sexually Violent Predators in the Courtroom:
Science on Trial, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 357, 361 (2006) (citing twin concerns that "good
science" will be unrecognized or misunderstood by the law, and that the pressures of the law will not
only use but encourage "bad science"); Cailey Miller et al., Reliability of Risk Assessment Measures
Used in Sexually Violent Predator Proceedings, PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT, May 7, 2012, at 4-6 (reviewing
the reliability of several assessment instruments used in SVP evaluations).
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instruments.37
Contemporaneous sex offender civil commitment legislation could not
have developed as it did were it not linked securely to the scientific
community's findings, especially since such laws were constitutionally
upheld as civil acts premised on general civil commitment laws that were
already found to be constitutional.38 But we must honestly and thoroughly
investigate the reasons supporting the enactment of such legislation while
scrutinizing legislative usage of medical and scientific testimony to support
sex-offender commitments. 9 Before we could even begin to address the
problems surrounding the science, however, we would need to re-consider
the laws and foundations on which they were based.
H. REHABILITATION
A. The myth of rehabilitation
In order to examine rehabilitation, we must begin by looking at the
focus of civil commitment and incarceration.40 Prison's main purpose is
37. Shoba Sreenivasan et al., Alice In Actuarial-Land: Through the Looking Glass of Changing
Static-99 Norms, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY. & L. 400, 401 (2010) (When designers of the original
Static-99 sexual offense recidivism actuarial tool analyzed newer Static-99 studies, they found that the
recidivism rates reported in the original Static-99 norms were not holding firm because they were based
on recidivism rates from the 1970s and 1980s, which were higher than current rates. The Static-99
designers determined that re-norming was warranted in order to create a more accurate actuarial tool).
38. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("We have consistently upheld such
involuntary commitment statutes provided the confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures
and evidentiary standards.") (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) and Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426-27 (1979)).
39. Id. at 359 ("[S]tates have, over the years, developed numerous specialized terms to define
mental health concepts. Often, those definitions do not fit precisely with the definitions employed by the
medical community. The legal definitions of 'insanity' and 'competency,' for example, vary
substantially from their psychiatric counterparts."); see, e.g., id. at 360 ("Hendricks' diagnosis as a
pedophile, which qualifies as a 'mental abnormality' under the Act, thus plainly suffices for due process
purposes."); see also Heather Ellis Cucolo, Hebephilia and Pedohebephilia: Implications for Law and
Policy, 12 SEX OFFENDER L. REP. 55, 56, 63 (2011) (explaining the potential issues that may result from
allowing hebephilia, a disorder not currently recognized in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the
American Psychiatric Association, to justify indefinite confinement of sexual offenders by reason of
mental disorder).
40. See KURT BUMBY, CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., UNDERSTANDING TREATMENT FOR
ADULTS AND JUVENILES WHO HAVE COMMITTED SEX OFFENSES 9 (2006), available at
http://www.csom.org/pubs/treatment_brief.pdf ("For professionals in the sex offender management
field, it is virtually impossible to avoid the inevitable question about whether sex offenders can be
treated or rehabilitated. A definitive response-either in the negative or affirmative-would imply that a
simple answer exists, when in reality, the answer is not a clear-cut one. Yet as is often the case in the
social and behavioral sciences, there tends to be evidence on either side of the issue of interest. The
same holds true with research on sex offender treatment, whereby both skeptics and advocates can
produce some level of empirical evidence to support their respective positions."); see also Donna Schram
& Cheryl Milloy, Sexually Violent Predators and Civil Commitment: A Study of the Characteristics and
Recidivism of Sex Offenders Considered for Civil Commitment But for Whom Proceedings Were
Declined, Doc. No. 98-02-1101, WASHINGTON STATE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY at i (1998),
available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/pub.asp?docid-98-02-1101 (explaining that when tracking the
[Vol. 22:110
PREVENTING SEX-OFFENDER RECIDIVISM
punishment, and since prisons are generally designed to neither foster nor
seriously invest in inmate rehabilitation, 41 any specific treatment for sex
offenders is an "added bonus" outside of the reason for incarceration. 42
Once an individual enters sex-offender civil commitment, 43 the focus is
ostensibly no longer on punishment but containment with an emphasis on
treatment.44 In order to comport with constitutional mandates, the treatment
must be offered such that the conditions of confinement do not become
punitive.45 In upholding a state sex offender civil commitment statute in
Hendricks, the Supreme Court offered little insight into the standards for
treatment.46 Subsequent case law has discussed treatment for sex offenders,
but focused mainly on whether certain aspects of confinement invalidated
the civil nature of the statute.47 Treatment has never been deemed a
official records of sixty-one sex offenders who had been released during the first 6 years of the
Washington Community Protection Act of 1990, they found
that41%ofthegroupwerenotrearrestedatameanfollow-upofalmostfouryears, and, of the 59% who were
rearrested, only 28% had committed further sex offenses; the non-
offenderscouldhavebeensubjectedtolifesentenceswithoutparole).
41. Michelle Phelps, Rehabilitation in the Punitive Era: The Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality in
U.S. Prison Programs, 45 L. & SOc'Y REV. 33, 34-35 (2011) (discussing the seemingly punitive nature
of the current penal system in the United States that has replaced the more rehabilitation-focused
correctional facilities and programs of the past).
42. See BUMBY, supra note 40, at I (asserting that often sex offender specific treatment is denied or
not offered while an individual is serving a criminal sentence, leading to a "punish first, treat later"
strategy).
43. Compare Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 377 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part, rev'd in
part, Wyatt v. Aderholt, 303 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1978) ("To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty
upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide
adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process.") (citations omitted) with Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[W]here the justification for commitment was
treatment, it offended the fundamentals of due process if treatment were not in fact provided . . . where
the justification was the danger to self or to others, then treatment had to be provided as the quidpro quo
society had to pay as the price of the extra safety it derived from the denial of individuals' liberty."). For
the most recent discussion of "quid pro quo" theory of Wyatt in the civil commitment context, see
Michael L. Perlin, "Abandoned Love:" The Impact of Wyatt v. Stickney on the Intersection Between
International Human Rights and Domestic Mental Disability Law, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 121, 129-
30(2011).
44. See Fabian, supra note 35, at 82 ("[T]he Washington State Legislature found that 'a small but
extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist' that need treatment and confinement in a
secured setting.").
45. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 367-69 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that providing treatment also
assures that the conditions and duration of confinement bear a reasonable relation to the purpose for
which persons are confined, another requirement of due process); see also Seling v. Young, 531 U.S.
250, 265 (2001) ("[D]ue process requires that the conditions and duration of commitment ... bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed.") (citations omitted).
46. The Hendricks Court used the language "vague and overly broad" in discussing the standards
without much further insight; Justice Breyer's dissent suggests that a civil scheme that requires
treatment yet systematically denies access to treatment violates both substantive due process and ex post
facto clause. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Court in Hendricks conceded that
the specific treatment program offered Hendricks "may have seemed somewhat meager." Id. at 367; see
also Michael L. Perlin, There's No Success like Failure/and Failure's No Success at All: Exposing the
Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247, 1264 (1998) (discussing the Court's
ambiguous description of what satisfies a state's treatment obligation).
47. See Turay v. Seling, 108 F.Supp.2d 1148, 1151 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (explaining how persons
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constitutional right by the U.S. Supreme Court,48 but most states-in an
effort to quash challenges alleging punitive detainment-consider it a duty
to provide treatment and a "right" of the offender to participate. 49
B. What treatment is offered during confinement and how does it prevent
future recidivism?
Our ability to keep sex offenders locked away is dependent on the
notion that such detention is civil in nature and holds no punitive intent. To
that end, we can constitutionally detain individuals for care and treatment
through sex offender civil commitment. 0 However, there is no consensus as
to the effectiveness of treatment or whether the treatment that is made
available to this population has had any real effect on risk reduction.'
Relatively little is known about which sex offenders will benefit from
treatment, what treatment is most effective, and how treatment affects
involuntarily confined through civil proceedings must be afforded adequate treatment); see also In re
Det. of Betsworth, 711 N.W.2d 280, 288-89 (Iowa 2006) (determining the statutory right to treatment
was satisfied as long as an individualized treatment program designed to assist in controlling deviant
behaviors was offered).
48. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (holding that there is no per se right to
rehabilitative training, and minimal training is only required when it is reasonably necessary to avoid an
unconstitutional infringement on freedom from undue restraint); Perlin, supra note 43, at 125 ("[The]
U.S. Supreme Court eventually failed to constitutionalize some of these holdings in the lead case of
Youngberg v. Romeo . . . ").
49. Jeslyn A. Miller, Sex Offender Civil Commitment: The Treatment Paradox, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
2093, 2101 (2010) ("Most state statutes detail treatment either as a 'right' belonging to the committed
offender or as a duty of the state.").
50. See, e.g., John Petrila, Because They Do Horrible Things: Fear, Science, and the Erosion of
Civil Liberties in Sexually Violent Predator Proceedings, 36 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 359, 380 (2008)
("[T]he courts have rarely insisted that treatment be provided, based in part on assumptions that this is a
group of individuals for which little exists in the way of treatment."). See also James F. Quinn et al.,
Societal Reaction to Sex Offenders: A Review of The Origins and Results of the Myths Surrounding
Their Crimes and Treatment Amenability, 25 DEVIANT BEHAV. 215, 219 (2004) ("The belief that sex
offenders are unredeemable predators is so widely accepted in modem society that it provides a rallying
point for victims' groups, conservative politicians, and others with the desire to build consensus on the
need to make penal sanctions harsher.").
51. See, e.g., In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1003 n.7 (Wash. 1993)("It is by no means clear that the
mental abnormalities and personality disorders underlying the sex predator condition are
'untreatable."'), superseded by statute as stated in In re Det. of Thorell, 72 P.3d 708, 720-21 (Wash.
2003); see also Danielle M. Polizzi et al., What Works in Adult Sex Offender Treatment? A Review of
Prison- and Non-Prison-Based Treatment Programs, 43 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP.
CRIMINOLOGY 357, 358 (1999) (addressing the "little consistency in the conclusions drawn from meta-
analyses and literature reviews with regard to the effectiveness of sex offender treatment on reducing
recidivism."); Michael C. Seto & Howard E. Barbaree, Psychopathy, Treatment Behavior, and Sex
Offender Recidivism, 14 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1235, 1244 (1999) (exploring why uncertainty
continues to exist as to whether treatment is detrimental for psychopaths who are considered to be the
highest risk of offenders); Jan Looman et al., Does Consideration of Psychopathy and Sexual Deviance
Add to the Predictive Validity of the Static-99R?, INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP.
CRIMINOLOLGY (forthcoming 2012),
http://ijo.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/05/24/0306624X 12444839 (noting that it is unknown whether
the disparate levels of treatment subjects received in a psychopath versus sexual deviant recidivism
study affected their actual levels of recidivism).
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recidivism. 5 2 The question then becomes: does treatment hold any verifiable
outcome of effectiveness for this population; and if not, then at what point
does it become clear that this detention offers no other purpose but for
continued confinement post criminal sentence, thus implicating a punitive
statutory design?s3
In a 2006 article, Drs. Robert Prentky and Barbara Schwartz suggested
that, "[p]erhaps the more pressing question, certainly from a public policy
standpoint, is 'who' is most likely to be impacted by treatment and how best
should they be treated."5 4 There is no known cure for inappropriate sexual
thoughts or behavior and it is believed that biological (surgical castration
and pharmacological interventions)5 and non-biological (cognitive-
behavioral therapy) 6 options are the only confirmed methods for reducing
risk." Cognitive-behavioral treatment may include social skills training, sex
52. Mamie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, What We Know and Don't Know About Treating Adult Sex
Offenders, in PROTECTING SOCIETY, supra note 9, at 101, 103 (Bruce K. Winick & John Q. La Fond
eds., 2003)(stating that there are not enough well-controlled studies to accurately determine the benefits
of treatment through a meta-analysis).
53. See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If the object or purpose of the
Kansas law had been to provide treatment but the treatment provisions were adopted as a sham or mere
pretext, there would have been an indication of the forbidden purpose to punish.").
54. Robert Prentky & Barbara Schwartz, Treatment ofAdult Sex Offenders, VAWNET: NAT'L ONLINE
RES. CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 6 (Dec. 2006) available at
http://www.vawnet.org/Assoc FilesVAWnet/ARSexOffendTreatment.pdf.
55. Chemical castration is considered to be potentially effective in its role of reducing obsessive
thoughts and/or fantasies in addition to suppressing violent tendencies. It does not have much success in
changing the object of one's attraction but can have a marked effect on reducing the desire to act on
sexual impulses. See Robert D. Miller, Forced Administration ofSex-Drive Reducing Medications to Sex
Offenders: Treatment or Punishment?, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 175, 181-83 (1998) (discussing that
the model for effective pharmacological treatment for sex offenders is based on the notion that
medication must suppress the psychological component of sexual deviation, which causes the deviant
sexual fantasies, and thereby inhibit the physical sexual arousal).
56. For studies and articles which use or support the use of cognitive behavioral therapy for sex
offenders, see James R. Worling & Tracey Curwen, Adolescent Sexual Offender Recidivism: Success of
Specialized Treatment and Implications for Risk Prediction, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 965, 968
(2000) ("[W]e utilize the repertoire of cognitive-behavioral and relapse prevention strategies that are
currently popular in adolescent and adult sexual offender treatment . . . ."); W.L. Marshall & Dana
Anderson, Do Relapse Prevention Components Enhance Treatment Effectiveness?, in REMAKING
RELAPSE PREVENTION WITH SEX OFFENDERS: A SOURCEBOOK39, 46 (D. Richard Laws et al., 2000)
(discussing the effect of relapse prevention in the context of cognitive-behavioral therapy); D. Richard
Laws & W.L. Marshall, A Brief History of Behavioral and Cognitive Behavioral Approaches to Sexual
Offenders: Part 1. Early Developments, 15 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 75, 83, 86 (2003)
(discussing generally the history of behavioral therapy and its transitions to current use); ROBERT J.
McGRATH ET AL., CURRENT PRACTICES AND EMERGING TRENDS IN SEXUAL ABUSER MANAGEMENT:
THE SAFER SOCIETY 2009 NORTH AMERICAN SURVEY 71-74 (The Safer Society Press 2010) (outlining
the various forms of behavioral sexual arousal control treatments used in therapy); and STEVE AOS ET
AL., WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, EVIDENCE-BASED ADULT CORRECTIONS PROGRAMS: WHAT
WORKS AND WHAT DOES NOT 5 (2006), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/06-01-1201.pdf
("On average, we found these programs [forms of cognitive-behavioral therapy] significantly reduce
recidivism by 8.2 percent.").
57. See Lauren Cox, Treating Pedophiles: Therapy Can Work, But It's a Challenge, MY HEALTH
NEWS DAILY (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.myhealthnewsdaily.com/2015-treating-pedophiles-therapy-
challenge.html (quoting Dr. Fred Berlin and David Prescott, who state that "[tiwo decades of published
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education, cognitive restructuring, aversive conditioning and victim
empathy therapy.58
The treatment model thus far has been a treatment-as-management
approach," "includ[ing] cognitive behavioral treatment to recondition
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, relapse prevention to support and monitor
self-management skills in avoiding high risk situations and
places." 60Commentators have stated that sex offender "civil commitment, in
particular, has been described by civil libertarians as preventive detention
masquerading as coerced treatment that threatens rehabilitation, justice, and
constitutional values, and legitimizes warehousing."6' Additionally,
treatment providers in these institutions may lack competency and
qualification, which supports the notion that treatment is only in place to
make the case for continued confinement after prison.62
A 2011 study by the Program Evaluation Division of the State of
Minnesota's Office of Legislative Auditor (OLA), 63 looking at Minnesota's
sex-offender civil commitment scheme, found:
* The number of civilly-committed sex offenders in the
Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) nearly quadrupled
during the last decade and is expected to nearly double over
the next ten years.6
* The number of court commitments as a percentage of referrals
from the Department of Corrections varies significantly across
the state. 61
* OLA's statistical analysis suggests that some sex offenders
work with sex offenders haven't produced a cure . . . . Instead, therapists aim to help pedophiles resist
their urges . . .. We don't know how to change the fact that a person is sexually attracted to children.");
KAREN J. TERRY, SEXUAL OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 152-63 (2006)
(summarizing types of medical treatments, cognitive-behavioral treatments, and prison treatment
programs); see also Reinhard Wille & Klaus M. Beier, Castration in Germany, 2 ANNALS SEX RES.
103, 125 (1989) (finding in a study in Nazi Germany that the recidivism rate of surgically-castrated sex
offenders was 3% compared to a 46% recidivism rate for non-castrated sex offenders); Ariel R6sler &
Eliezer Witztum, Pharmacotherapy of Paraphilias in the Next Millennium, 18 BEHAV. SC. & L. 43, 44
(2000) ("Most of the patients are currently treated with some form of psychotherapy or
pharmacotherapy, or a combination of both.").
58. Richard B. Krueger & Meg S. Kaplan, Behavioral and Psychopharmacological Treatment of the
Paraphilic and Hypersexual Disorders, 8 J. PSYCHIATRIC PRAC. 21, 24-25 (2002).
59. Astrid Birgden & Heather Ellis Cucolo, The Treatment of Sex Offenders: Evidence, Ethics and
Human Rights,23 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT295, 299-300 (2011).
60. Id. at 299.
61. Id. at 303.
62. See, e.g., WEST VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 14("Sex offender assessment and treatment requires
an approach unfamiliar to most mental health professionals. At this time, West Virginia does not require
any formal process of certification or licensure of those providing treatment or diagnostic services to sex
offenders, creating inconsistencies in the methods and underlying philosophical framework of treatment
programs and services."); see also MCGRATH ET. AL., supra note 56, at 33(stating fewer than one-fifth of
United States providers hold doctoral degrees).
63. MINN. OFFICE OF LEGIS. AUDITOR, CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS (2011), available at
http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/ccso.pdf.
64. Id. at ix, 3-5.
65. Id. at ix, 34.
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being committed may have a lower risk of recidivism than
others who are being released from prison.66
* Minnesota lacks reasonable alternatives to commitment at a
high security facility. Lower-cost alternatives may be
appropriate for some sex offenders being considered for
commitment or already residing at MSOP facilities.67
* No sex offender has been discharged from MSOP since it was
created in 1994.68 Without releases, Minnesota is susceptible to
lawsuits challenging the adequacy of the treatment program.69
* MSOP's treatment program has experienced frequent
leadership changes and significant staff vacancies, and it has
struggled to maintain the type of therapeutic environment
necessary for treating high-risk sex offenders. 0
* Current MSOP management has worked to address security
problems and clinical deficiencies, but it still needs to increase
the number of treatment hours provided, improve the
therapeutic environment, and establish clearer guidelines for
judging treatment progress.'
Recently, the conditions at MSOP have been the subject of a class action
lawsuit contesting the constitutionality of locking away offenders for gross
extensions of time.7 2 Potentially, the above findings may suggest a punitive
intent of confinement and call into question the realities of treatability of
this population given the fact that the release rate has been almost non-
existent within the seventeen years that the program has been up and
66. Id. at ix, 39.
67. Id. at ix, 42-44.
68. Id. at ix, 19. However, this is not entirely accurate. See Judicial Panel Gives Final OK On
Discharge of Sex Offender From Minnesota Program, TWIN CITIES (Feb. 10, 2012),
http://www.twincities.com/localnews/ciI 9940882?IADID=Search-www.twincities.com-
www.twincities.com (reporting that the state released an offender in 2000, but he violated the terms of
his release and was returned to the program in 2003); Warren Wolfe, A Turning Point for State's Sex
Offender Program, STAR TRIBUNE (Minn.), Feb. 19, 2012,
http://www.startribune.com/local/stpaul/139595093.html (reporting that a second offender was approved
for release in February 2012); see also Ian Evans, Britain Denies Extradition of Minnesota Sex Suspect,
STAR TRIBUNE (Minn.), June 28, 2012, http://www.startribune.com/local/1 60704485.html (reporting that
the Minnesota program made international news recently when a London (UK) High Court refused to
return an alleged sex offender to Minnesota to face criminal charges after officials in Hennepin and
Dakota counties refused to guarantee he would not be committed to the state's controversial sex offender
program, because such institutionalization "would be a 'flagrant denial' of Sullivan's human rights under
Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.").
The authors wish to thank Anita Schlank, Jack B. Schaffer and John Austin for their assistance in
bringing this information to their attention.
69. MINN. OFFICE OF LEGIS. AUDITOR, supra note 63, at ix, 52.
70. Id. at ix, 58-61, 65-72.
7 1. Id. at ix.
72. See, e.g., Mary Lynn Smith & Dave Hage, Minnesota Sex-Offender Lawsuit Takes Step
Forward, STAR TRIBUNE (Minn.), July 25, 2012,
http://www.startribune.com/local163607246.html?refemy (reporting on a lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of Minnesota's sex offender treatment program).
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C. Why is so little attention paid to rehabilitation?
This all raises the rarely-asked question: why is so little attention paid
to rehabilitation? A review of the treatment offered and the facilities
designed to contain individuals who have committed sexual offenses seems
to confirm the answer that society has no intention or desire to return these
individuals to the community.74 For many people, the phrase "sex offender"
automatically implies "monstrous imminent evil."" Public pressure on
politicians calls for sex offenders to be effectively managed through
deterrence-based methods,76 though the academic community propounds
therapeutic methods.7 Treatment for sex offenders has been defined as "the
delivery of prescribed interventions as a means of managing crime-
producing factors and promoting positive and meaningful goal attainment
for participants, all in the interest of enhancing public safety."7 1 When
designing containment laws, legislative goals have been directed towards
making the public feel safer, rather than helping the offender live
successfully and thrive as a member of the community upon his
73. See Wolfe, supra note 68.
74. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 253B.185, subdiv. 18 (2011) ("A patient who is committed as a sexual
psychopathic personality or sexually dangerous person shall not be discharged unless it appears to the
satisfaction of the judicial appeal panel, after a hearing and recommendation by a majority of the special
review board, that the patient is capable of making an acceptable adjustment to open society, is no
longer dangerous to the public, and is no longer in need of inpatient treatment and supervision. In
determining whether a discharge shall be recommended, the special review board and judicial appeal
panel shall consider whether specific conditions exist to provide a reasonable degree of protection to the
public and to assist the patient in adjusting to the community. If the desired conditions do not exist, the
discharge shall not be granted."). See generally Sarah E. Spierling, Lock Them Up and Throw Away the
Key: How Washington's Violent Sexual Predator Law Will Shape the Future Balance Between
Punishment and Prevention, 9 J.L. &POL'Y 879, 899-903 (2001) (discussing how many sexual predator
statutes undermine effective therapy by "delaying treatment until after a criminal sentence has been
served" and by forcing offenders to undergo treatment, and articulating the views of some prosecutors
that the primary purpose of civil commitment after a criminal sentence is to "ensure the commitment of
these persons in order to protect the community" rather than to rehabilitate the offender).
75. See, e.g., Christina Hebel, 'An Unsuitable Instrument' for Sex Offenders: EU Politicians
Angered By Polish Chemical Castration Plan, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L, Sep. 25, 2008,
http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/europe/0,1518,580284,00.htmi (noting that Polish Prime Minister,
Donald Tusk, has called for the introduction of forced chemical castration for sex offenders, saying that
in the case of sex offenders, "one can't even argue on behalf of human rights" since he "[doesn't] believe
such individuals, such creatures, can be called human"); see Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government:
Explaining America's Severity Revolution, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 217, 229 (2001) (characterizing the
public view of sex offenders as "those who are perceived as in the grip of evil or monstrous desires").
76. E.g., Kenneth Crimaldi, "Megan's Law": Election-Year Politics and Constitutional Rights, 27
RUTGERS L.J. 169, 169 n.2, 172 (1995) (discussing how the media and public attention given to Megan
Kanka's assault and murder pressured the New Jersey legislature to enact a mandatory community
notification policy, "Megan's Law," which was based on a perception that sex offenders were more
difficult to rehabilitate, and thus recidivate at higher rates).
77. See Laurie 0. Robinson, Sex Offender Management: The Public Policy Challenges, 989
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SC. 1, 2 (2003) (asserting that punitive measures alone cannot solve the sex
offender policy problem and that multidisciplinary approaches are necessary).
78. BUMBY, supra note40, at 2.
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release.79Any focus on human rights and rehabilitation for sex offenders has
been put forth on a limited basis by the academic community, and has been
severely neglected in the legislatures and courts.s0
III. ANTI-THERAPEUTIC AND INHUMANE SOLUTIONS UPON RELEASE
A. Are individuals who have committed sex offenses unworthy of
constitutional and legal protections?
States (and the federal government) have enacted laws to attempt to
reduce recidivism and to ensure that certain offenders are monitored in the
community, once civil or criminal confinement ends."'
In 1994, New Jersey enacted Megan's Law in response to community
outrage in the aftermath of the brutal rape and murder of seven-year-old
Megan Kanka by a convicted sex offender.82 This horrific offense was the
catalyst" behind a law that would track all convicted sex offenders and
publicly display where they resided in the community.84 Parallel legislation
to Megan's Law was subsequently enacted on the federal level to further
79. See Charles L. Scott & Trent Holmberg, Prisoners' Rights Versus Public Safety, 31 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY &L. 502, 503 (2003) (summarizing a number of punitive legislative strategies
recently enacted to penalize and isolate sex offenders from the public).
80. Beyond the scope of this paper is an analysis of the application of the United Nations'
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to this population. For a general discussion of that
document, see, for example, Michael L. Perlin, "A Change Is Gonna Come": The Implications of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of
Constitutional Mental Disability Law, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483, 489-97 (2009); for a discussion of its
implications for forensic populations, see MICHAEL L. PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, 100-01 (2012); for a discussion of the
implications of international human rights instruments for forensic patients and correctional inmates in
general, see Astrid Birgden & Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Home in the Valley Meets the Damp Dirty
Prison ": A Human Rights Perspective on Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Forensic
Psychologists in Correctional Settings, 14 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAv. 256, 257-58 (2009); Astrid
Birgden & Michael L. Perlin, 'Tolling for the Luckless, the Abandoned and Forsaked': Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and International Human Rights Law as Applied to Prisoners and Detainees by Forensic
Psychologists, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 231, 234-38 (2008); Michael L. Perlin &
Henry A. Dlugacz, "It 's Doom Alone That Counts": Can International Human Rights Law Be an
Effective Source of Rights in Correctional Conditions Litigation?, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 675, 691-94
(2009).
81. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (West 2005) ("The legislature finds and declares: a. The
danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders and offenders who commit other predatory acts against
children ... require[s] a system of registration that will permit law enforcement officials to identify and
alert the public when necessary for the public safety.").
82. Karen Newburn, The Prospect of an International Sex Offender Registry: Why an International
System Modeled After United States Sex Offender Laws Is Not an Effective Solution to Stop Child Sexual
Abuse, 28 Wis. INT'L L.J. 547, 548-49 (2010) (describing the details of the crime committed against
Megan Kanka and the legislative response).
83. Id
84. Under Megan's Law, offenders must register their address with local authorities; they are placed
into one of three tiers based on their perceived level of risk. Megan's Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7
(West 2005 & Supp. 2012); Artway v. Att'y Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1243 (3d Cir. 1996) (upholding
registration aspects of New Jersey's Megan's Law).
Fall 2012] 17
compel conformity among the states." Within this legislation was the
authorization to create a national registry of offenders who are convicted of
coercive, penetrative sex with anyone, and/or offenders who have had sex
with children under the age of twelve. 6 By 2005, this national registry was
available on the Internet and was linked to twenty-two state online
registries." In 2006, Congress enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act.8 This legislation contains the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act (SORNA),9 which has increased the pool of
individuals required to register as well as the length of time that they are
required to register.90 In order to expand the group of individuals subject to
registration, Congress broadly defined sex offense as a "criminal offense
that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another,"
in addition to other enumerated categories of offenses.91SORNA greatly
expanded qualifying crimes and offenses and departed from tradition
significantly in its treatment of juvenile offenders.92 By 2006, all fifty states
and the District of Columbia had enacted some form of community
85. Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d))
(repealed 2006).
86. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFF. OF THE Arr'Y GEN., A.G. ORDER NO. 2196-98, MEGAN'S LAW;
FINAL GUIDELINES FOR THE JACOB WETTERLING CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN AND SEXUALLY VIOLENT
OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT, AS AMENDED, (Dec. 17, 1998), available at
http://pub.bna.com/cl/19990120/2196.htm (defining aggravated offenses as "state offenses comparable
to aggravated sexual abuse as defined in federal law (18 U.S.C. 2241), which principally
encompasses:(1) engaging in sexual acts involving penetration with victims of any age through the use
of force or the threat of serious violence; and (2) engaging in sexual acts involving penetration with
victims below the age of 12").
87. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Off. of Justice Programs, Department of Justice Activates
National Sex Offender Public Registry Website: Twenty-Two States Accessible from National Website,
(July 20, 2005), http://www.amberalert.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/ojp_05 0720.htm.
88. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006)
(codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., & 42 U.S.C.). See generally Lori McPherson,
Practitioner's Guide to the Adam Walsh Act, UPDATE: NAT'L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE,
no. 9 & 10, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/practitionerguide-awa.pdf
(providing guidance for prosecutors on new provisions in the Adam Walsh Act).
89. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911-29 (2006).
90. See McPherson, supra note 88, at 2 (explaining requirements of SORNA, which expand the
length of time during which offenders must be registered, increase the amount of detailed information
required, and apply to more tiers of offenders).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A). According to HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No Easy Answers: Sex
Offender Laws in the U.S., 19, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1, 39-40 (2007), at least five states require
registration for adult prostitution-related offenses; thirteen states require registration for public urination;
twenty-nine states require registration for consensual sex between teenagers; and thirty-two states
require registration for exposing genitals in public. See also Rainer v. State, 690 S.E.2d 827, 828-29
(Ga. 2010) (upholding provision of the state's sex offender registry law that requires the registration of
certain persons not convicted of sex crimes).
92. Michael F. Caldwell et al., An Examination of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act as Applied to Juveniles Evaluating the Ability to Predict Sexual Recidivism, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 89, 105-06 (2008) (noting that a provision of SORNA that redefines juvenile court
adjudication for a sexual offense as synonymous with conviction is a departure from the common view
of juvenile delinquency as different from adult criminal behavior). See generally Doe v. Weld, 954 F.
Supp. 425,426-27 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding Massachusetts' juvenile statute constitutional).
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notification and registration requirements.93 As of 2008, thirty states had
enacted residency restrictions for offenders in the community.9 4
In order to effectively comply with SORNA, state public websites must
include:
The name of the sex offender, including any aliases.
The address of each residence at which the sex offender resides or
will reside and, if the sex offender does not have any (present or
expected) residence address, other information about where the sex
offender has his or her home or habitually lives. If current
information of this type is not available because the sex offender is
in violation of the requirement to register or is unable to be located,
the website must so note.
The name and address of any place where the sex offender is an
employee or will be an employee and, if the sex offender is
employed but does not have a definite employment address, other
information about where the sex offender works.
The name and address of any place where the sex offender is a
student or will be a student.
The license plate number and a description of any vehicle owned or
operated by the sex offender.
A physical description of the sex offender.
The sex offense for which the sex offender is registered and any
other criminal offense for which the sex offender has been convicted.
A current photograph of the sex offender.95
Failure to comply is a violation of federal law and the offender is either
fined or imprisoned.96 Ignoring Supreme Court precedent,97 and acting
93. RICHARD GARY ZEVITZ & MARY ANN FARKAS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE
SEX OFFENDER COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT IN WISCONSIN 1-2 (Dec. 2002)
available atwww.ncjrs.gov/pdflilesl/nij/179992.pdf.
94. Michelle L. Meloy, et al., Making Sense Out ofNonsense: The Deconstruction of Stale-Level
Sex Offender Residence Restrictions, 33 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 209, 214 (2008).
95. 73 Fed. Reg. 38030, 38059(July 2, 2008) (explaining registration requirements in 42 U.S.C. §
16914 & 16918); U.S. ATr'Y GEN., THE NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
AND NOTIFICATION-FINAL GUIDELINES 36 (2008), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/finalsomaguidelines.pdf.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(3)(2006) (stating that a sex offender found in violation shall be fined or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both); see also Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Consequences of
Sex Offender Registration, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 67, 69 (2005) (highlighting some of the legally
mandated consequences of failure to register as a sex offender under SORNA).
97. Since 1995, the Supreme Court has struck down the regulation of non-economic criminal
activity under the Commerce Clause as an intrusion on the police power authority of the states. See, e.g.,
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) ("Indeed, we can think of no better example of the
police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the
suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
562-63 (1995) ("We agree with the Government that Congress normally is not required to make formal
findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce . . . . But to the extent
that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in
question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible
to the naked eye, they are lacking here.").
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without any express legislative findings regarding an impact on interstate
commerce," Congress invoked the Commerce Clause to authorize the
federalization of registration violations."
In 2007 administrative authorization retroactively applied the Adam
Walsh Act to successfully develop a "comprehensive" system, which would
be effective in protecting the public by widening the scope to include all
offenders-regardless of when they were convicted. 00 Therefore, a
defendant is de facto a criminal the moment the law goes into effect and can
be prosecuted for" failure to register" without an allegation of any
subsequent offense.o'0 This is directly in violation of prior Supreme Court
mandates that an element of a crime should not be viewed as continuing
"unless the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute compels
such a conclusion, or the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress
must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one." 02
Although Congress has echoed the unverified conclusion that individuals
who commit sexual offenses are likely to re-offend, it has done so without
specific legislative support.03 By continuing to criminalize an element of
the crime through retroactive application of the law and by further
criminalizing failure to register, Congress has overstepped its constitutional
authority. '"
Community notification and residency restriction laws have been
criticized as immoral, cruel and inhumane, and detrimental to the goal of
reducing sexual offending. 0 The efficacy of these laws has been sharply
98. Congress' authority to act has generally been preconditioned on legislative findings. The
Supreme Court echoed this notion in the prominent area of affirmative action where specific legislative
findings were required. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236
(1995)(requiring Congress to justify affirmative action legislation with specific findings because
"classifications based on race are potentially so harmful to the entire
bodypolitic,itisespeciallyimportantthatthereasonsforanysuchclassificationbe clearly identified") (quoting
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989) (stating legislatures "must identify that discrimination, public or private,
with some specificity before they may use race-conscious relief').
99. Previously state crimes, registration violations are now punished by federal sanctions. See
United States v. Madera, 474 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2007)(unsuccessfully challenging the
Adam Walsh Act registration provision on several bases including the Commerce Clause), rev d on
other grounds, 528 F.3d 852 (11th Cir. 2008).
100. Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 28 C.F.R. § 811.1 (2012).
101. Id. at § 811.3(b).
102. Corey Rayburn Yung, The Disappearing Ex Post Facto Clause: From Substantive Bulwark to
Procedural Nuisance, 61 SYR. L. REv.447, 452 (2011) (quoting United States v. Toussie, 397 U.S. 112,
115 (1970)).
103. See United States v. Buxton, No. CR-07-082-R, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76142, at *10 (W.D.
Okla. Aug. 30, 2007) ("Congress expressly stated that the purpose of SORNA was 'to protect the public
from sex offenders and offenders against children."').
104. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 ("The Government admits, under its 'costs of crime' reasoning,
that Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime,
regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce . . . . Under the theories that the
Govemment presents. . . it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as
criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign.").
105. See Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Effect of Megan's Law on Sex Offender Reintegration,
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debated, with many questions surrounding the legality and morality of
ostracizing offenders after release,'06 as well as the weight of the expense
generated by these laws'07 measured against the degree to which they
protect the community. 0 If a criminal has paid his debt to society by
concluding his sentence,'09 how can society limit where he chooses to live
upon release?"o How have these laws passed constitutional muster and
overcome challenges of ex post facto and double jeopardy?"' The present
system of registering offenders does not distinguish between those who will
be dangerous in the future from those who were formerly dangerous." 2 It
bundles statutory rape cases that deal with sexual interactions between
teenagers-interactions that would otherwise be consensual but for the age
of one of the partners-with cases of individuals who have committed
violent pedophilic offenses." It seems obvious that such a system is
unreliable and unfair."l4
Additionally, these defendants are forever branded with a "scarlet
21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 49, 62 (2005) (analyzing data retrieved through an empirical study on the
positive and negative consequences of community notification on sex offenders' rehabilitation).
106. See Birgden & Cucolo, supra note 59, at 304 (arguing that contemporary sex-offender treatment
violates rights, is ineffective, and is unethical).
107. Zgoba, supra note 18, at 36 (discussing the costs of implementing Megan's Law, citing
particularly a 155% increase in ongoing expenses between 2006 and 2007).
108. See, e.g., State v. Kedging, 571 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a
commitment order was an abuse of discretion where placement options outside of offender's county of
residence were not considered); McCreary v. State, 582 So.2d 425, 428 (Miss. 1991) ("[B]anishmcnt
from a large geographical area . . . struggles to serve any rehabilitative purpose . . . ."); MINN. DEP'T OF
CORR., LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDERS: RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT ISSUES, 2003 REPORT TO THE
LEGISLATURE 9 (2003) (observing sex offender proximity to schools or parks is not associated with
recidivism).
109. Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, and the
Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 How. L.J. 753, 767 (2011).
110. See United States v. Pitts, No. 07-157-A, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82632, at *15 (M.D. La. Nov.
7, 2007) (holding the statutorily authorized prison sentence of up to ten years for failing to register did
not provide reason to find that a prosecution under SORNA was punitive in nature).
Il l. W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1211, 1217 (D.N.J. 1996) (holding Megan's Law
constitutional despite ex post facto clause challenge and stating that the notification requirements did not
impose "punishment" on sex offenders); United States v. Husted, No. CR-07-105-T, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 56662, at *10 (W.D. Okla. 2007), rev'd on other grounds, 545 F.3d 1240 (10" Cir. 2008)
(reversing on statutory interpretation grounds but not on ex post facto clause grounds).
112. See Carl Bialik, How Likely are Sex Offenders to Repeat Their Crimes, WALL ST. J. NUMBERS
GUY BLOG (Jan. 24, 2008, 11:35PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/numbersguy/how-likely-are-sex-offenders-
to-repeat-their-crimes-258/ (noting that the majority of sex-offenders are unlikely to reoffend, while
others commit "unusually harmful" acts when they do, but statutory schemes make all offenders comply
with registration laws).
113. Steve James, Romeo and Juliet Were Sex Offenders: An Analysis of the Age of Consent and a
Callfor Reform, 78 U. MO.-KAN. CITY L. REV. 241 (2009); see also Birgden & Cucolo supra note 59, at
300 (stating that consensual sex between teenagers was included in the 660,000 registered sex offenders
as of 2008).
114. In no way do we suggest that criminal behavior should be excused; it absolutely should be
criminally prosecuted in accordance with our laws and determinations as to what constitutes a sexual
crime. But in the context of monitoring after an individual has been adjudicated for that crime or served
his or her criminal sentence, we contend that consideration of the degrees of dangerousness, riskiness
and heinousness of the prior crime should be taken into account.
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letter,"" 5 notwithstanding the fact that they have already been criminally
punished for their offenses. Every aspect of their lives-including personal
life choices such as place of residence,"'6 employment,"' and Internet
use"'-has the potential to be intruded upon, scrutinized, and judged.
Under the law, general criminals (those convicted for non-sexually
motivated offenses) are often branded with the after-effects of a criminal
conviction when seeking employment or dealing with federal and state
agencies," 9 but nothing else approximates the public display of distrust and
alienation directed towards individuals who have committed sexual
offenses.
B. How far will we infringe on human rights?
Although we recognize that the phrase "sex offender" automatically
infers "monstrous imminent evil," 2 0 does that label give us justification to
deny human rights mandated under international law? Article 17 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that "[n]o one
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and
reputation." 2' Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks. Residency restrictions prevent individuals who
have committed sexual offenses from living within specific proximities to
115. See, e.g., Lara Geer Farley, The Adam Walsh Act: The Scarlet Letter of the Twenty-First
Century, 47 WASHBURNL.J.471, 502 (2008) (arguing against the "scarlet letter" punishment of requiring
non-violent offenders who are unlikely to recidivate to register as sex offenders for the rest of their
lives).
116. See ZEVITZ & FARKAS, supra note 93, at 9 (discussing a study of thirty sex offenders in the state
of Wisconsin revealed that twenty-three of thirty described being humiliated regularly, ostracized by
neighbors and lifetime acquaintances, and harassed or threatened by nearby residents or strangers).
117. See generally Shelley Albright & Fujen Denq, Employer Attitudes Towards Hiring Ex-
Offenders, 76 PRISON J. 118, 127-35 (1996) (analyzing empirical research conducted on the issues ex-
offenders face in employment).
118. See Sex Offenders Are Barred from Internet by New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2007,
www.nytimes.com/2007/12/28/nyregion/28offender.html.
119. See generally Love, supra note 109, at 770-74 (discussing the stigmas and difficulties in seeking
and maintaining employment post-release from prison, including being rejected for jobs due to private
employers "running routine background checks," especially those "businesses hoping for a government
contract or grant," as well as being prohibited from volunteer opportunities and discouraged from
contributing to politicians' campaigns).
120. See, e.g., Simon, supra note75, at 229 (describing sex offenders as one group of criminals
viewed by society as persons "in the grip of evil or monstrous desires"); see also, Joseph E. Kennedy,
Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, Hastings L.J. 873-76,
881-87 (2001) (discussing the "monstrous" conceptualization of sex offenders, and observing "the social
construction of the problem of the sexual abuse of children illustrates perfectly the scapegoating of
monstrous offenders as a way of dealing with deeply felt social anxieties").
121. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 17, (Mar. 23,
1976). But see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004) (holding that the ICCPR is not self-
executing and does not confer a private cause of action: "[A]lthough the Covenant does bind the United
States as a matter of international law, the United States ratified the Covenant on the express
understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the
federal courts.").
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schools, parks and other areas where children congregate.122 These
ordinances are aimed at prohibiting offenders from residing within
particular areas and inevitably within particular cities.123
Residency restrictions range anywhere from 100 feet to 2500 feet from
any designated area in which minors congregate and apply to the individual
regardless of the prior criminal or offense history.124 Therefore, a criminal
whose victims did not include children and who has no history of interest in
or attraction to children is still subject to ordinances preventing him from
living within a specified distance from places where children may be
found.'25 The case of Doe v. Millerl26 exemplifies the courts' failure in
acknowledging the vast differences within the sex offender population and
the resulting offenses, and their refusal to acknowledge and consider
scientific data about sex-offending behaviors.
Doe challenged an Iowa law'27 prohibiting any person convicted of
certain sex offenses involving minors from residing within 2000 feet of a
school or registered childcare facility.128 At trial, no scientific data were
introduced regarding how the treatment of certain clinical disorders might
affect the risks for sexual recidivism.129 The district court found that the
statute was unconstitutional and amounted to ex post facto punishment,
violated the plaintiffs' rights to avoid self-incrimination, and violated
substantive due process, because it infringed on rights to travel and rights to
choose how to conduct "family affairs."3 0
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court, concluding that
the Constitution did not prevent Iowa from regulating the residency of sex
122. See, e.g., Cobb v. State, 437 So.2d 1218, 1220 (Miss.1983) (upholding a probation condition
requiring the defendant to "stay out of Stone County.").
123. See Steven Brown et al., What People Think About the Management of Sex Offenders in the
Community,47 HOWARD J.259, 272-73 (2008)(explaining a study finding that the public does not
necessarily agree with punitive conditions but is insecure in the effectiveness of community containment
and concerned about the reality of reintegration); Shelley Ross Saxer, Banishment of Sex Offenders:
Liberty, Protectionism, Justice, & Alternatives, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1397, 1405-11 (2009) (explaining
how sex offender residency restrictions "banish" sex offenders from living in certain areas or
communities).
124. Corey Rayburn Yung, Bqnishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex
Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 101at122-26 (2007) (noting various state residency restrictions).
125. See id. at 123 (noting that most states apply residency restrictions to those whose crimes did not
involve children).
126. 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 870 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev d, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
127. IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A (West 2004) ("1. For purposes of this section, 'person' means a
person who has committed a criminal offense against a minor, or an aggravated offense, sexually violent
offense, or other relevant offense that involved a minor. 2. A person shall not reside within two thousand
feet of the real property comprising a public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school or a childcare
facility. 3. A person who resides within two thousand feet of the real property comprising a public or
nonpublic elementary or secondary school, or a childcare facility, commits an aggravated
misdemeanor.").
128. Id.
129. See Doe, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 876 (noting that while this case primarily focused on proximity
restrictions, no data was shown to illustrate the relationship between proximity restrictions and
recidivism).
130. Id. at 872-80.
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offenders in order to protect the health and safety of its citizens.'
Significant in the majority opinion is the failure to consider any information
regarding how the treatment of certain clinical disorders might affect the
risks for sexual recidivism.'32 Furthermore, the court failed to consider any
of the amicus briefs that were designed to educate the court about the
relevant science and data.' Only the dissent speaks to the potential
problems in applying the Iowa law to all convicted offenders, regardless of
their history and risk of re-offending. 3 4 Further, it faults the Iowa law for
viewing all sex offenders as being at equal risk of recidivism.'
Due to the restrictions upheld by the Doe court, individuals may be
uprooted and forced to move from established residences, may be unable to
return home after prison, and may be prevented from residing with their
own children, thus further disabling the family unit and removing the
needed support of family members.' 6 One such example involves the case
131. Doe, 405 F.3d at 705.
132. See id. at 716 (noting that expert testimony suggested reducing opportunity and temptation to
minimize the possibility of re-offense).
133. See id. at 709 ("We likewise conclude that the Iowa residency restriction does not contravene
principles of procedural due process under the Constitution. The restriction applies to all offenders who
have been convicted of certain crimes against minors, regardless of what estimates of future
dangerousness might be proved in individualized hearings. Once such a legislative classification has
been drawn, additional procedures are unnecessary, because the statute does not provide a potential
exemption for individuals who seek to prove that they are not individually dangerous or likely to offend
against neighboring schoolchildren. Unless the Does can establish that the substantive rule established
by the legislative classification conflicts with some provision of the Constitution, there is no requirement
that the State provide a process to establish an exemption from the legislative classification") (citation
omitted). See also id. at 714 ("The Does contend, however, that the statute is irrational because there is
no scientific study that supports the legislature's conclusion that excluding sex offenders from residing
within 2000 feet of a school or child care facility is likely to enhance the safety of children. We reject
this contention because we think it understates the authority of a state legislature to make judgments
about the best means to protect the health and welfare of its citizens in an area where precise statistical
data is unavailable and human behavior is necessarily unpredictable. Although the Does introduced one
report from the Minnesota Department of Corrections finding 'no evidence in Minnesota that residential
proximity of sex offenders to schools or parks affects reoffense,' this solitary case study-which
involved only thirteen reoffenders released from prison between 1997 and 1999-does not make
irrational the decision of the Iowa General Assembly and the Governor of Iowa to reach a different
predictive judgment for Iowa. As the district court observed, twelve other States have enacted some
form of residency restriction applicable to sex offenders.") (footnote omitted).
134. Id. at 726 (Melloy, J., dissenting). The dissent makes note of the varying degrees of sexual
offenses:
However, the restriction also applies to John Doe II, who pleaded guilty to third degree
sexual abuse for having consensual sex with a fifteen-year-old girl when he was twenty
years old. The restriction applies to John Doe VII, who was convicted of statutory rape
under Kansas law. His actions, which gave rise to this conviction, would not have been
criminal in Iowa. The restriction applies also to John Doe XIV, who pleaded guilty to a
serious misdemeanor charge in 1995 after he exposed himself at a party at which a thirteen-
year-old girl was present. John Doe XIV was nineteen at the time of his offense.
Id.
135. See id. (pointing out that the Iowa residency restriction "is applied to all offenders identically . .
mak[ing] the residency restriction excessive").
136. See Jill Levenson & Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Damage: Family Members of Registered
Sex Offenders, 34 Am. J. CRAM. JuST. 54, 55-56 (2009) (noting housing disruption is a common result of
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of Wendy Whitaker, who engaged in a single act of consensual oral sex
with a fifteen year old when she was seventeen years old.' She was
arrested and charged with the crime of sodomy.' Over ten years later, she
was forced from her home because of its proximity to a childcare center.'
After the Georgia Supreme Court in Mann v. Georgia Department of
Correctionsl40 held that the Georgia statute which prohibited registered sex
offenders from residing within 1000 feet of any child care facility, school or
church where minors congregate, was an impermissible taking without
adequate compensation,141 Ms. Whitaker returned to her home believing that
since she owned her home she had a right to reside there. Despite the fact
that she owned her own home, the Columbia County Sheriff's Office
ordered Ms. Whitaker to vacate her residence within seventy-two hours
because it was within 1000 feet of a church with a child care center.142
Residency restrictions banishing undesirable individuals from our
communities are supported by the fear and belief that individuals would
undoubtedly reoffend.143 Sex offenders are banished to neighboring counties
or states, and often corralled into poor neighborhoods and placed in
boarding houses to reside solely with other sex offenders.'" Dr. Paul
sex offender registration requirements). The Doe court specifically addressed and dismissed the
argument of banishment:
[Wihile banishment of course involves an extreme form of residency restriction, we ultimately do
not accept the analogy between the traditional means of punishment and the Iowa statute. Unlike
banishment,#692A.2A restricts only where offenders may reside. It does not "expel" the offenders
from their communities or prohibit them from accessing areas near schools or child care facilities
for employment, to conduct commercial transactions, or for any purpose other than establishing a
residence.
Doe, 405 F.3d at 719.
137. Pre-Hearing Brief and Status Report at 9, Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-140-CC (N.D. Ga.
Nov.11, 2008).
138. Fourth Amended Complaint - Class Action for Injunctive Release Jury Trial Demanded at 9,
Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-cv-140-CC (N.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Amended Complaint];
Bill Rankin, Restricted by Registry No More: Lead Plaintiff Against Ga. Sex Offender Law Can Live
Where She Wants to, Now, ATLANTA J.-CONST., at B5 Sept. 18, 2010, available at
http://www.schr.org/files/post/Wendy/ 20AJC%209%201 8%2010.pdf.
139. Amended Complaint, supra note 138, at 9-10; Rankin, supra note 138, at B5.
140. 653 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2007).
141. Id. at 744-45 (explaining that the statute applied to a registered sex offender who purchased
home in accordance with the statute but was later forced to move when a child care center opened within
1000 feet of the residence).
142. Rankin, supra note 138, at BI; see also Sarah Geraghty & Melanie Velez, Bringing
Transparency and Accountability to Criminal Justice Institutions in the South, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 455, 486, 487 n.190 (2011) (illustrating the general repercussions of the Georgia residency
requirement after its passage and recounting the specific case of Wendy Whitaker).
143. See, e.g., Karen Sloan, Towns Fear an Influx of Offenders, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,Oct.4,
2005,atlA (reporting on proposed local ordinances in Nebraska that would restrict sex offender
residency, based on community fears of an influx of sex offenders from jurisdictions in which residency
restrictions were already in place and a desire to protect children from such sex offenders); see also
Saxer, supra note 123, at 1452 (noting that sex offenders are "undesirable" and there is a fear they will
reoffend); Des Moines Zones Out Molesters, OMAHA WORLD- HERALD,Oct. 13, 2005,at 2B (reporting on
a Des Moines ordinance that places residency restrictions on sex offenders).
144. Saxer, supra note 123, at 1399-40; Michael J. Duster, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: State Attempts
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Appelbaum clearly describes the fallout and potential harms in a 2008
column discussing community notification:
Given the consternation aroused by sex offenders, it can hardly
be unexpected that the typical consequences of such disclosure
are loss of housing, jobs, and friends. Yet these are just the kind
of supports that can anchor a released offender in a community
and reduce recidivism. Numerous reports have surfaced of
offenders being threatened, harassed, and in rare cases killed after
community notification. Suicide also has been reported. Perhaps
most disturbing is the large number of states that fail to limit
disclosures to predatory offenders, instead extending the process
to everyone convicted of a sexually related offense. Swept up in
this net are people who have committed noncontact crimes, such
as exhibitionism or peeping, those whose only offense occurred
as children, and persons who engaged in consensual sex with a
somewhat younger girlfriend or boyfriend and were convicted of
statutory rape.145
C. Who's afraid of the big, bad wolf?
We designed our community containment laws based on certain
perceived truths: (1) that convicted sex offenders pose a greater danger to
the public when they reside near places where children frequent,146 (2) that
we can dispose of the problem by limiting their housing options in
municipalities,147 and (3) that sex offenders coming out of prison or sex
offender civil commitment have a high re-offense rate for contact sexual
crimes.'14 Yet studies conducted in a number of states do not confirm the
to Banish Sex Offenders, 53 DRAKE L. REv.711, 712 n.2(2005).
145. Paul Appelbaum, Law & Psychiatry: Sex Offenders in the Community: Are Current Approaches
Counterproductive?, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES352, 353 (2008) (footnotes omitted), available
athttp://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/data/Joumals/PSS/3843/08ps352.pdf.
146. Duster, supra note 144, at 714-16; Sloan, supra note 143, at IA. But see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 91, at 103-04 (citing the lack of evidence supporting assertion that prohibiting offenders from
living near children actually protects children from sexual violence); Ass'N FOR THE TREATMENT OF
SEXUAL ABUSERS, FACTS ABOUT ADULT SEX OFFENDERS (Apr. 5, 2010), available
athttp://www.atsa.com/sexual-offender-residence-restrictions(stating that currently no studies show a
relationship between residence,distancefromaschoolorchild-carefacility,andanincreasedlikelihood of
recidivism).
147. See, e.g., Duster, supra note 144, at 717-18 (discussing attempts to restrict sex-offender housing
options); Saxer, supra note 123, at 1452 (explaining generally the public policy behind residency
requirements).
148. Consider the following discussion in Doe, 405 F.3d at 714-15:
There can be no doubt of a legislature's rationality in believing that "[s]ex offenders are a
serious threat in this Nation," and that "[w]hen convicted sex offenders reenter society, they
are much more likely than any other type of offender to be re-arrested for a new rape or
sexual assault." Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 4(alterations in original) (quoting
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32-33, (2002) (plurality opinion)). The only question
remaining is whether, in view of a rationally perceived risk, the chosen residency restriction
rationally advances the State's interest in protecting children.
Id. But see Hanson, supra, note33, at 63 (stating that according to a major study done by the Bureau of
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above listed beliefs:
* A New Jersey study sampling 268 sexual offenders found that
(1) the strict residency restrictions caused a housing shortage
for tracked offenders,149 and (2) offenders who targeted adults
were more likely to live closer to children than those who
offended against children.s0
* In 2006, New York released a study analyzing 19,827 sex
offenders and found that: (1) "[t]he rate for new sex offenses
after one year in the community was 2 percent"; and (2) "[t]he
cumulative rate increased to 3 percent after two years, 6
percent after five years, and 8 percent after eight years."'5 '
* A study in California followed ninety-three high-risk sex
offenders and in 2006 issued results showing that after six
years on the street, "4.3 percent of these worst-of-the-worst
offenders had committed new sex offenses."' 52
* Alaska reported in 2007 that "3 percent of sex offenders had
committed a new sex crime in their first three years after
release from prison."' 3
* Tennessee "found that 4.7 percent of 504 sex offenders
released from prison in 2001 were arrested for a new sex
offense after three years. The sex crime recidivism rate was
zero for offenders whose original crime was incest." 5 4
* Missouri tracked 3166 offenders between 1990 and 2002-
covering a period before the enactment of residency
restrictions and SORNA-and found that 12% had been re-
arrested for a new sex crime and of that 12%, 10% had been
reconvicted.15
* A 2007 Minnesota Department of Corrections study "tracked
[3166] sex offenders released from Minnesota prisons between
1990 and 2002" and found that "after an average of 8.4 years
in the community, 10 percent had been convicted of a new sex
offense. Those released in the beginning of the study period
Justice Statistics, when measured by re-arrest for the same type of crime, rapists had a relatively low rate
of arrest for another rape (7.7%) compared to larcenists (33.5%), burglars (31.9%), and drug offenders
rearrested for drug offenses (24.8%)).Only murderers had a lower recidivism rate for the same crime
than rapists. ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 5 (Apr. 1989), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr83.pdf).
149. Michael Chakewski & Cynthia Calkins Mercado, An Evaluation of Sex Offender Residency
Restriction Functioning in Town, County, and City-Wide Jurisdictions, 20 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 44,
45, 58 (2009).
150. Id. at 49-50.
151. Chris Domin, Facts and Fiction About Sex Offenders: Part 3 of a 3-Part Series, SENT'G & JUST.





Fall 2012] PREVENTING SEX-OFFENDER RECIDIVISM 27
TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
were much more likely to reoffend within three years than
those released later-17percent in 1990 as opposed to 3
percent in 2002.156
* West Virginia tracked 325 sex offenders from 2001-2003 and
found that: (1) "[t]he recidivism rate for any return to prison,
not just for sex crimes, was 9.5 percent"; (2) "six[individuals]
returned for new sex related crimes," which included three
crimes of failing to register; (3) "[t]he sex crime recidivism
rate was slightly less than 2 percent"; and (4) "[o]nly 1 percent
had an actual sex crime victim."5 7
Given the data that demonstrates the low recidivism rates for sex
offenders (as compared with other criminals),"' it appears that bias and
stigma surrounding the type of crime committed-sexual offenses-is what
fuels our legislation.' Thus we ignore and disregard current studies and
instead act based on unfounded myths.' 60
D. Do community notification and registration laws contribute to low
reconviction and re-offense rates?
Despite the substantial costs, little research has been conducted to
examine whether such laws enhance community protection.' 6' In terms of
community notification, it would appear that Megan's Law has failed to
significantly reduce re-offending. 62 The legislative assumption was that
156. Id.
157. Dornin, supra note 151, at 6.
158. Sarah E. Agudo, Irregular Passion: The Unconstitutionality and Inefficacy of Sex Offender
Residency Laws, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 307, 308 n.l (2008).
159. Id. at 308.
160. ROB FREEMAN-LONGO, CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT SEX
OFFENDERS, (Kristin Little & Scott Matson, eds., 2000), available at
http://www.csom.org/pubs/mythsfacts.html ("There are many misconceptions about sexual offenses,
sexual offense victims, and sex offenders in our society. Much has been learned about these behaviors
and populations in the past decade and this information is being used to develop more effective criminal
justice interventions throughout the country. This document serves to inform citizens, policy makers,
and practitioners about sex offenders and their victims, addressing the facts that underlie common
assumptions both true and false in this rapidly evolving field.").
However, some statutes have created narrow laws that may prove to me more effective than
others. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.030 (West 2012) (providing that "high-risk
offenders" cannot live within 880 feet of schools or daycare centers); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4-a)
(McKinney Supp. 2009) (providing that serious offenders cannot enter school grounds or facilities
caring for children).
161. Agudo, supra note 158, at 309, 339; Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Impact of Sex
Offender Residence Restrictions: 1,000 Feet From Danger or One Step From Absurd?, 49 INT'L. J.
OFFENDER THERAPY& COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 168, 169 (2005) [hereinafter Impact of Sex Offender
Restrictions].
162. See Victoria Simpson Beck et al., Community Response to Sex Offenders,32 J. PSYCHIATRY &
L.141, 165 (2004) ("Finally, some have argued that the stigmatizing and anti-therapeutic effects of
notification may increase the risks for recidivism."); Zgobra, supra note 18, at 39 (noting that although
there has been a downward trend in sex-offender recidivism, this trend began before the passage of the
Megan's Law, and therefore the decline cannot be "solely attributed" to the law).
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community notification would deter new offenses and citizens would take
protective measures against sex offenders; "[e]xactly what action is
expected is not clear."' 6  Unfortunately, these strategies are based on
evidence that is anecdotal or plain conjecture.'" As noted above, the
efficacy and cost of Megan's Law has been thoroughly examined,' 6 and
comparing constitutional challenges,'66 some courts have begun to question
the intent of the legislation and render opinions finding certain regulations
unconstitutional.' 67 The U.S. Supreme Court has been reluctant to review
many of the decisions regarding community notification and registration,' 68
but, in 2003, the Court issued three separate decisions on the retroactive
application of SVP laws. Of the three cases, Smith v. Doe'69  and
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe'0 upheld the retroactive
application of these laws and rejected arguments of ex post facto
violations."' The Court found both statutes to be non-punitive, and gave
little weight to the consequential stigma and potential negative impact of
these laws. 7 2 Only Stogner v. California113 held that application of the
163. Beck et al., supra note 162, at 142.
164. Rice & Harris, supra note 52, at 102 (noting that "treatment effectiveness will be grossly
overestimated in studies if treatment refusers and dropouts are ignored"); Simon, supra note9, at 149-50
(describing the disjuncture between legislation and the empirical realities of sex crimes).
165. Zgoba et al., supra notel8.
166. See generally Mann v. State, 603 S.E.2d 283, 285 (Ga. 2004) (finding a residency statute not to
be in violation of the Constitution's proscription against ex post facto laws); Thompson v. State, 603
S.E.2d 233, 234 (Ga. 2004) (finding a statute preventing a person required to register as a sex offender
from living within 1000 feet of any area where minors congregate not to be in violation of ex post facto
doctrine); Denson v. State, 600 S.E.2d 645, 646(Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that statute was not an
unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied); People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 776-78 (lil. App. Ct.
2005) (finding that residency restriction was not in violation of the constitutional right to due process);
State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 670 (Iowa 2005) (holding that statute did not violate substantive due
process or ex post facto clause); Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 453 F.3d 1010, 1016-20 (8th Cir.
2006)(finding that residency restriction did not violate constitutional right to travel, ex post facto law, or
substantive due process).
167. The appeals court in Mann determined that an unconstitutional taking had occurred where an
offender was forced to move from his home after a child-care facility opened within 1000 feet of his
property. 653 S.E.2d at 741. In rendering its decision, the court considered the economic hardship that
occurred as a result of the taking as well as the interference with an individual's reasonable investment-
backed expectation when purchasing property for a private residence. Idat 744. The court additionally
assessed the statute and found that it effectively empowered private third parties with the state's police
power. Id at 745.In 2009, Indiana's Supreme Court, in State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145 (Ind. 2009)
held that the residency restriction "violate[d] the prohibition on ex post facto laws . . . because it
impose[d] burdens that ha[d] the effect of adding punishment beyond that which could have been
imposed [at the time the] crime was committed." Id. at 1154.
168. Charles Scott & Trent Holmberg, Castration of Sex Offenders: Prisoners' Rights Versus Public
Safety, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 502, 508 (2003).
169. 538 U.S. 84,105-06 (2003) (holding that the retroactive application of the registration and
notification requirements of the Alaska SVP statute did not violate the ex post facto clause).
170. 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003) (finding that even if the public notification procedures implicated a liberty
interest, sex offenders were not entitled to a hearing to determine whether they were currently dangerous
before their inclusion in the registry).
171. Smith, 538 U.S. at 105-06 (finding no ex post facto violations); Conn. Dept of Pub. Safety, 538
U.S. at 2 (same).
172. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 98 ("Any initial resemblance [of Alaska's compulsory registration] to
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California law, which extended the time to prosecute sexual crimes, was
unconstitutionally ex post facto as applied to Stogner.17 4
A number of scholarly articles have found that the strict ordinances
banning offenders from living in numerous areas within the state result in a
situation that is the modem equivalent of the medieval sanction of
banishment.' Scholars have proposed that residency restriction laws are, in
fact, counterproductive in their strict application, and can result in
homelessness and isolation; they have the opposite effect of promoting safe
communities by actually heightening the risk of re-offense.1 6 Such strict
application of these laws-combined with their effects of isolation and
humiliation-can provoke feelings of hopelessness, and unworthiness, and
can cause both lack of dignity and feelings of being "less than human"
among sex offenders."' Hardships placed on individuals in the community
early punishments is, however, misleading .... Even punishments that lacked the corporal component,
such as public shaming, humiliation, and banishment, involved more than the dissemination of
information.").
The Court in Conn. Dept of Pub. Safety,538 U.S. at 6-7, relied on Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976), which had held that mere injury to reputation, even if defamatory, does not constitute the
deprivation of a liberty interest. The Court concluded that:
In short, even if respondent could prove that he is not likely to be currently
dangerous, Connecticut has decided that the registry information of all sex
offenders-currently dangerous or not-must be publicly disclosed. Unless
respondent can show that that substantive rule of law is defective (by conflicting
with a provision of the Constitution), any hearing on current dangerousness is a
bootless exercise.
Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 7-8.
173. 539 U.S. 607 (2003).
174. Id. at 609.
175. See Yung, supra note 124, at 103-04, 106-07 (discussing the concept of banishment for sex
offenders subjected to harsh residency restrictions); see also ZEVITZ & FARKAS, supra note 93, at 9-11
(discussing the challenges faced in placing sex offenders in housing in residential areas post-
incarceration); Saxer, supra note 123, at 1405-11 (explaining how sex offender residency restrictions
"banish" sex offenders from living in certain areas or communities); Sex Offenders Living Under Miami
Bridge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/04/08/us/08bridge.html (describing a group
of sex offenders forced to live under a bridge because they could not obtain housing in accordance with
a Miami-Dade county ordinance limiting where sex offenders can live).
176. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 91, at 9-10 (stating that transiency and lack of
habilitation has caused Iowa officials to lose track of offenders); Tewksbury, supra note 96, at 78-79
(stating that the use of sex-offender registries may lead to social withdrawal and greater anxiety and
stress for sex offenders; this process, for some sex offenders, can be a precursor to re-offending); Meloy
et al., supra note 6, at 438 (stating that the shaming of offenders increases deviant behavior); Stephanie
Chen, After Prison, Few Places for Sex Offenders to Live, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A16
(expressing that residency restrictions may destabilize past offenders); Yung, supra note 124, at 105
(describing the social ostracization and isolation that offenders are faced with); Jeffrey Koffman, Sex
Offenders Live in Village Under Miami Bridge, ABC NIGHTLINE (Sept. 3, 2009),
http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/sex-offenders-live-miami-bridge/story~id=8420696#.UEf~e45Dz7J
(identifying past sex offenders who now live as pariahs under the Julia Tuttle Causeway in Miami);
Saxer, supra note 123, at 1400 (stating that concentration of offenders in poor neighborhoods may result
in adverse community impacts).
I 77. See Fred Cohen, From the Editor: Sex Offender Registration Laws; Constitutional and Policy
Issues, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 151, 153 (1995) (explaining that the implementation of "Megan's Law"
generates such public stigma and social ostracism as to be viewed as punitive); Abril R. Bedarf,
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serve to break down protective measures and increase stressors, two of the
major catalysts claimed by experts to fuel relapse."' The psychological
stress from "isolation, disempowerment, shame, depression, anxiety [and]
lack of social supports . . . can trigger some sex offenders to relapse."'7 9
Clearly, the end result of our efforts serves no benefit to the offender or the
community.
There needs to be a shift in our conceptualization and inevitable
interaction with this population in order to be successful in combating the
inherent problems of sex-offender punishments. Specifically, we need to
confront and analyze our fears and construct solutions that account for the
human rights of all persons. Our approach to change must begin by
examining these issues through the lens and application of therapeutic
jurisprudence.
IV. THROUGH THE LENS OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
A. Therapeuticjurisprudence: An overview
One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past
two decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of therapeutic
jurisprudence ("Ti").8 0 TJ presents a new model for assessing the impact of
Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 910 (1995) (explaining
that community notification jeopardizes an offender's ability to reintegrate into society and lead a
productive life); ZEVITZ & FARKAS, supra note 93, at 9 (finding that seventy-seven percent of
interviewed sex offenders told of being humiliated in their daily lives and ostracized by neighbors and
lifelong acquaintances due to expanded notification actions); see also Michael L. Perlin, "Dignity Was
the First to Leave ": Godinez v. Moran, Colin Ferguson, and the Trial of Mentally Disabled Criminal
Defendants, 14 BEHAV. SC. & L. 61, 75 (1996) (discussing the constitutional significance of dignity in
the criminal trial process); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW (forthcoming 2013).
178. Levenson & Cotter, supra note 105, at 62.
179. Impact of Sex Offender Restrictions, supra note 161, at 169 (citation omitted).
180. See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC
AGENT3-4, 19-20 (1990) (discussing TJ's origins in mental health law and the general growth of
applying the social sciences to legal scholarship); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, at xviii-xix (1996)
(describing the growing body of academic literature on TJ arising from the fields of law, psychology,
psychiatry, criminology, and philosophy, as well as discussing TJ's evolution and growing influence);
BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 7-8 (2005)
(discussing TJ's domestic and international growth, noting that TJ "evolved out of the work of [David
B.] Wexler and [Bruce] Winick in mental health law, and has emerged as one of the most important
influences on the field. It has since spread across the legal landscape, emerging as a mental health
approach to law generally") (footnotes omitted); David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17, 17(2008) (discussing the growth of therapeutic jurisprudence
from its birth in mental health law to its effects on the "entire legal spectrum"); I MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 2D-3, at 534-41 (2d ed. 1998) (providing a
discussion of the relatively nascent yet growing TJ approach and the various areas of law it has been
applied to over the years, as well as the new areas that scholars are beginning to explore through the
therapeutic jurisprudence perspective). Wexler first used the term in a paper he presented to the National
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) in 1987. See David B. Wexler, The Development of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: From Theory to Practice, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 691, 693 (1999) (describing Wexler's
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case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law
can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences.'' The ultimate aim
of TJ is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can
or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not
subordinating due process principles.'82 There is an inherent tension in this
inquiry, but David Wexler clearly identifies how it must be resolved: the
law's use of "mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning
. . . [cannot] imping[e] upon justice concerns."' As one of us (MLP) has
written elsewhere, "an inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that
therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil rights and civil liberties."'8 4
TJ, which is a descendant of legal realism, "asks us to look at law as it
actually impacts people's lives"' and focuses on the law's influence "on
emotional life and psychological well-being."'86 It "suggests that law should
value psychological health, should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic
consequences whenever possible, and when consistent with other values
served by law, should attempt to bring about healing and wellness."'"By
way of example, "[t]herapeutic jurisprudence aims to offer social science
evidence that limits the use of the incompetency label by narrowly defining
its use and minimizing its psychological and social disadvantage."' 8
work on a paper for the NIMH workshop that first made the "therapeutic jurisprudence perspective
explicit"); David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 33 (1992) (explaining that Wexler's interest in TJ "jelled" in
1987, culminating in a paper he wrote for a NIMH workshop).
181. See Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill": How Will Jurors
Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 885, 912 (2009)
("[TJ] presents a new model by which we can assess the ultimate impact of case law and legislation that
affects mentally disabled individuals . . . by studying the role of the law as a therapeutic agent."). See
Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, inDISPUTES AND
DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW 91 (lan Freckelton & K. Peterson eds., 2006), for a transnational
perspective on TJ.
182. Michael L. Perlin, "And My Best Friend, My Doctor! Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got": The
Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 751
(2005); Michael L. Perlin, "Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain ": Considering the
Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals
and in Asia,83 WASH. U. L. REV. 481, 510 n.139 (2008); see also Michael L. Perlin, "You Have
Discussed Lepers and Crooks ": Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 727-28 (2003)
(discussing the benefits of applying TJ to clinical teaching).
183. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of Legal Scholarship, II
BEHAv. SC. & L. 17, 21 (1993).
184. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CiN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000); Michael L. Perlin,
"Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline ": Mental Disability Law, Theory and Practice, "Us"
and "Them", 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998).
185. Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing with Victims of
Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009) (footnote omitted).
186. David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psycholegal Soft Spots and Strategies,
in PRACTlCING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45, 45 (Daniel P. Stolle,
et al., eds. 2000) [hereinafter STOLLEET AL.].
187. Bruce Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in INVOLUNTARY
DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL
COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003).
188. Claire B. Steinberger, Persitence and Change in the Life of the Law: Can Therapeutic
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In recent years, scholars have considered a vast range of topics through
a therapeutic jurisprudence lens, including, but not limited to, all aspects of
mental disability law, domestic relations law, criminal law and procedure,
employment law, gay rights law, and tort law.'89 As Ian Freckelton has
noted, "it is a tool for gaining a new and distinctive perspective utilizing
socio-psychological insights into the law and its applications."'9 0 It is also
part of a growing, comprehensive movement in the law towards
establishing more humane and psychologically optimal ways of handling
legal issues collaboratively, creatively, and respectfully.'9' These alternative
approaches optimize the psychological well-being of individuals,
relationships, and communities dealing with a legal matter, and
acknowledge concerns beyond strict legal rights, duties, and obligations. 92
In its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance rights, and
promote well being, therapeutic jurisprudence has been described as "a sea-
change in ethical thinking about the role of law ... a movement towards a
more distinctly relational approach to the practice of law . . . which
emphasise[s] psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism." 93
That is, TJ supports an ethic of care.194
Jurisprudence Make A Difference?, 27 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 65 (2003) (footnote omitted). The most
thoughtful, sympathetic critique of TJ remains Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five
Dilemmas to Ponder, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 193 (1995). See David B. Wexler, Reflections on the
Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 220, 220 n.2 (1995) (describing
Slobogin's work as "an excellent assessment and thoughtful critique" of TJ).
189. Michael L. Perlin, "Things Have Changed:" Looking at Non-Institutional Mental Disability
Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 537-38, 544-45 (2002-03).
190. Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and
Risks ofInfluence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 576 (2008).
191. Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence within the Comprehensive Law
Movement, in STOLLE ET AL, supra note 186, at 465.
192. E.g., Freckelton, supra note 190, at 575-80 (providing a lengthy overview of TJ's utility and
describing TJ as an approach to the law whereby beneficial and holistic societal outcomes for both the
individual(s) directly involved and society as a whole are meant to be maximized while the law's
therapeutic capacity to do both harm and good are realized).
193. Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 8 J.L. &
MED. 328, 329 (2001) (footnote omitted).
194. See, e.g., Gregory Baker, Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door? A "Therapeutic" Approach
to Enriching Clinical Legal Education Comes Calling, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 385 (2006) (noting
that the "TJ approach ... focuses on such things as improving interpersonal skills, practicing with a true
ethic of care, and viewing the law as a 'helping profession"'); Brookbanks, supra note 193, at 329-30
(presenting the thesis that Ti, with a significant focus on an ethic of care "redefines the role of law as a
means of problem-solving and offers an alternative approach to legal practice based on a model which
encourages relational intimacy, self-awareness, conciliation and restoration"); David B. Wexler, Not
Such a Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many oj) Professor Quinn's Concerns About
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597, 599 (2007) (concluding
that a TJ approach to criminal law "will encourage criminal lawyers to practice explicitly and
systematically with an 'ethic of care' and 'psychological sensitivity'); Bruce J. Winick & David B.
Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the
Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605-07 (2006) (describing the application of TJ as
calling for "an ethic of care and heightened interpersonal skills" amongst attorneys in order to best assist
their clients as "therapeutic agents").
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One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity. 95
Professor Amy Ronner describes the "three Vs": voice, validation and
voluntary participation, arguing:
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a
sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If
that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard,
and taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a sense of
validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a
sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the
outcome. Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary
participation, one in which the litigant experiences the proceeding as
less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants that
they voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered the end
result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives
can initiate healing and bring about improved behavior in the future.
In general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are
making, or at least participating in, their own decisions.19 6
B. Do sex offender laws and judicial proceedings promote a vision that is
consonant with the principles of "voice, validation, and voluntary
participation" proposed by Professor Ronner?
The origins and development of sex offender law have had a
profoundly anti-therapeutic effect. This is so for multiple reasons:
* The current universe of sex offender laws presumes a uniform
type of offender with uniform reasons for offending with
relatively static strengths and weaknesses.1' Nothing in the
literature supports this assumption.
* The current universe of sex offender laws presumes that
everyone is a recidivist.'98 According to a U.S. Bureau of
195. See, e.g., Steinberger, supra note 188, at 64 (describing TJ's focus on psychological and social
outcomes as including "feelings of dignity and self-worth"); Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless
Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeutic Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome,
24 TOURO L. REv. 601, 627-28 (2008) (describing evidence suggesting "that when individuals feel the
system has treated them with fairness, respect, and dignity, their behavior improves and they tend to
become healthier in their everyday lives") (footnote omitted).
196. Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94-95 (2002) (footnotes omitted). See
generally, AMY D. RONNER, LAW, LITERATURE, AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE23-24 (2010)
(discussing the importance, positive effects, as well as interaction of "the three Vs" and noting that voice
leads to validation, which, when combined with voice, tends to foster a sense of voluntary participation
in the legal system).
197. CHRYSANTHI S. LEON, SEX FIENDS, PERVERTS, AND PEDOPHILES: UNDERSTANDING SEX CRIME
POLICY IN AMERICA 181 (2011); Paul Noroian & Fabian M. Saleh, Residency Restrictions for Convicted
Offenders, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 422, 424 (2006).
198. See Benjamin Radford, Predator Panic: Reality Check on Sex Offenders, LIVE SCIENCE (May
16, 2006, 4:55 AM), http://www.livescience.com/776-predator-panic-reality-check-sex-offenders.html
("The high recidivism rate among sex offenders is repeated so often that it is usually accepted as truth,
but in fact recent studies show that the recidivism rates for sex offenses is not unusually high."). Cf
HowARD N. SNYDER, BUREAL' OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS
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Justice Statistics study ("Recidivism of Sex Offenders
Released from Prison in 1994"), just five percent of sex
offenders followed for three years after their release from
prison in 1994 were arrested for another sex crime. A study
released in 2003 by the [U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics]
found that within three years, 3.3[%] [or 141 of 4295]99 of the
released child molesters were arrested again for committing
another sex crime against a child. Three to five percent is
hardly a high repeat offender rate. In the largest and most
comprehensive study ever done of prison recidivism, the
Justice Department found that sex offenders were in fact less
likely to reoffend than other criminals. The 2003 study of
nearly 10,000 men convicted of rape, sexual assault, and child
molestation found that sex offenders had a re-arrest rate 25
percent lower than for all other criminals. Part of the reason is
that serial sex offenders-those who pose the greatest threat-
rarely get released from prison, and the ones who do are
unlikely to re-offend.2 00
* The current universe of sex offender laws presumes that the
most likely sex-offense scenario is what is awkwardly often
called "stranger rape."20' Statistics, though, indicate that the
majority of women who have been raped know their assailant.
A 1998 National Violence Against Women Survey revealed
that among those women who reported being raped, 59% were
victimized by a current or former husband, live-in partner, or
date.2 02 Also, a Bureau of Justice Statistics study found that
nearly three out of four rape or sexual assault victimizations
involved a single offender with whom the victim had a prior
relationship, such as a family member, intimate, or
acquaintance. 203 In the cases of child victims, there is no
question that relatives, friends, baby-sitters, persons in
REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS I (2000),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/saycrie.pdf (arguing that although "a few highly
publicized incidents" of sexual assaults have put the danger of sex crimes in the forefront of law
enforcement and the publics' minds, "there is little empirically-based information on these crimes").
199. Bialik, supra note 112.
200. Radford, supra note 198 (citations omitted).
201. See, e.g., id. (asserting that stranger rape is very rare, and that most child sexual abuse is
committed by a person whom the child knows).
202. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE & CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, STALKING IN AMERICA: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN SURVEY 6 (1998).
203. LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS:
AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 4 (1997), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/SOO.PDF; see also LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD ET AL., BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES: ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT OR
FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS, AND GIRLFRIENDS 4 (1998), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vi.pdf(supporting assertion that intimates account for a large
percentage of the violence against women).
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positions of authority over the child, or persons who supervise
children are more likely than strangers to commit a sexual
assault.2 04
* The current universe of sex offender laws presumes that
registration law and community "banishment" law minimizes
re-offending.2 05 There is no evidence that such laws are
effective in reducing re-offending,2 06 or that they provide
incentives for sex offenders to engage in treatment in the
community or demonstrate a pro-social lifestyle.2 07
* The current universe of sex-offender laws ignores the multiple
ways that the court process and the roles played by defense
counsel and the prosecution-as is done currently-support
cognitive distortions that can be used by sex offenders as ways
of justifying sexual offending2 08 and, by emphasizing
punishment, retribution, and incapacitation, often provide
disincentives for sex offenders to undergo treatment.2 09
Similarly, "the confrontational adjudicative process of
traditional courts encourages advocacy of innocence,
discourages acceptance of responsibility, and influences
[subsequent acceptance] of treatment once sentenced."2 10
On the other hand, scholars have crafted potential ameliorative
suggestions using TJ tools and methods. One of the co-authors (HEC) has
proposed a TJ approach in the form of Sex-Offender Courts for
sentencing.2 1' These courts would employ a non-confrontational system in
order to encourage acceptance of responsibility, to allow high-risk offenders
to be reevaluated throughout the terms of their sentence, to provide positive
reinforcement for changes in behavior and attitude during treatment, to
204. See SNYDER, supra note 198, at 9-10, 13 (explaining that offenders in child sexual assaults are
very rarely strangers to the victim).
205. Cf Baker, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67925, at *ll-14 (finding that a Georgia state law requiring
registered sex offenders to live at least 1000 feet from a child care facility or school was constitutional,
but acknowledging that if the law was more restrictive, it could be analogous to banishment).
206. Birgden & Cucolo, supra note 59, at 301 (arguing that registration laws do not decrease re-
offense rates); see Rice & Harris, supranote52, at 109 ("Simply put, the effectiveness of adult sex
offender treatment has yet to be demonstrated.").
207. Astrid Birgden, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Sex Offenders: A Psycho-legal Approach to
Protection, 16 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 351, 355 (2004).
208. Id. at 358.
209. William Edwards & Christopher Hensley, Contextualizing Sex Offender Management
Legislation and Policy: Evaluating the Problem of Latent Consequences in Community Notification
Laws, 45 INT'L. J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 83, 94-95 (2001).
210. Birgden & Cucolo, supra note 59, at 306; see also Birgden, supra note 207, at 357 (arguing that
offenders will only accept responsibility for their actions if legal actors take a motivational approach
towards the offender).
211. Cucolo, supra note 39; see, e.g., Pennsylvania to Be the Third State with Dedicated Sex
Offender Court, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (May 8, 2011),
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/05 -
May/Pennsylvania to be third state with dedicated sexoffendercourt/ (discussing sex-offender
courts in Pennsylvania and noting that New York and Ohio have similar regimes).
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allow for early release with intensive parole supervision, and to sanction the
placement of low-risk offenders in the community for monitoring and
treatment.2 2 In addition, reforms need to extend to the correctional system
and to the monitoring of the offender in the community.2 13
C. Why has the legal system been reluctant to adopt TJprinciples in sex
offender case law and legislation?
We can think of several overlapping reasons for why the legal system
has resisted TJ principles.
First, there is the fear of being seen as "soft on crime," imperiling the
judge's re-election chances.2 14 The literature is replete with studies of
political campaigns-many of which were successful-that turned on this
precise issue."'
Next, judges are traditionally adverse to endorsing or utilizing any
intervention that might be perceived as being "touchy-feely."2 16 In this
context, New York Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman has stated, "[s]ome see
the specter of well-meaning but misguided 'touchy-feely' judges intent on
pursuing rehabilitation and their own personal conceptions of social justice
at the expense of punishment and accountability."217
Third, like the general public, judges have, by and large, bought into
myths about sex offenses and sex offenders discussed earlier, and the
perceived positive impact of sex-offender laws on the general public.21 8
Thus, even though procedural fairness should be the touchstone of the
judicial process,219 it is very difficult to achieve this in sex-offender cases
where the public-and many judges-reject the notion that this cohort of
offenders even deserves" procedural fairness," in spite of the fact that such
fairness inevitably increases compliance with court orders.22 0
212. John Q. La Fond & Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Reentry Courts: A Proposal for Managing
the Risk of Returning Sex Offenders to the Community, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1173, 1196-97 (2004).
213. Id. at 1194.
214. Paul Carrington, Public Funding of Judicial Campaigns: The North Carolina Experience and
the Activism of the Supreme Court, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1965, 1990 (2011).
215. See id. at 1989-90 (discussing the California Supreme Court election of 1986 that led to the
defeat of Chief Justice Rose Bird and two other associate justices perceived in this way); John Blume&
Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case Selection: An Empirical Study,
72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 470-72 (1999) (discussing political campaigns aimed at ousting individual
judges for being "soft on crime").
216. See Jonathan Lippman, Achieving Better Outcomes for Litigants in the New York State Courts,
34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 813, 830 (2007).
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 13, at 552 (discussing the "small" likelihood of a judge ever
overruling a prosecutor's discretionary determination in such cases).
219. See, e.g., Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public
Satisfaction, 44 CT. REV. 4, 6 (2007-08) ("Procedural fairness matters to every litigant who appears
before a judge.").
220. See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter?: The Effect of Procedural
Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 163, 165 (1997) (stating that "[in speculating as to
why an adherence to fair procedures by authorities would lead to conformity by subjects, some ... adopt
the instrumentalist position that fair procedures will facilitate fair outcomes. It is the securing of
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Fourth, judges have a deep need to convince themselves that the
"system works."22 ' Judges typically express great faith in the adversary
system,222 and their opinions typically express a deep-seated "attachment to
commonly held beliefs,"223 notwithstanding the reality that "subconscious
influences can cloud their decisions and impede their legal reasoning," even
when "they desire to render a 'fair' decision."22 4
To a great extent, this all flows from the pernicious impact of heuristic
thinking and the meretricious impact of a false "ordinary common sense"
("OCS") on judicial decision-making.22 5 OCS is self-referential and non-
reflective ("I see it that way, therefore everyone sees it that way; I see it that
way, therefore that's the way it is").226 In criminal procedure, by way of
example, "OCS presupposes two self-evident truths: 1) everyone knows
how to assess an individual's behavior, and 2) everyone knows when to
blame someone for doing wrong." 2 7 Heuristics are "simplifying cognitive
devices that frequently lead to . . . systematically erroneous decisions
through ignoring or misusing rationally useful information." 228 Professor
Terry Maroney explains:
[Jludges are prone to the same heuristics and biases as are other
human beings, but also that these factors influence their judging-
and not always for the better. For example, judges overweight small
risks and underweight large ones, just as most people do. They also
are prone to anchoring, hindsight, and egocentric biases, and they
rely on ostensibly nonrational decisional tools such as intuition. 2 9
And Professor Eden King notes that:
[A]ttitudinal forces may be coupled with cognitive biases that lead
favorable outcomes which then secures compliance").
221. See, e.g., Burke & Leben, supra note 219, at 21 (discussing ways in which judges can improve
the public's satisfaction with the court system in the United States).
222. Daniel W. Shuman et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in the
Courts-Part II: A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193, 207 (1994) (reporting on survey results).
223. Lode Walgrave, Restoration in Youth Justice, 31 CRIME & JUST. 543, 547(2004).
224. Evan R. Seamone, Understanding the Person Beneath the Robe: Practical Methods for
Neutralizing Harmful Judicial Biases, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 1, 3 (2006) ("Consequently, in many
circumstances, for judges to be fair, they must be capable of identifying subconscious influences on their
behavior and they must neutralize the effects of such impulses.").
225. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL
16(2000) (discussing OCS as an "unconscious animator of legal decision making").
226. Michael L. Perlin, She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl: Neonaticide, The Insanity Defense, and the
Irrelevance of Ordinary Common Sense, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 8 (2003).
227. Id.
228. Michael L. Perlin, "They Keep It All Hid": The Ghettoization of Mental Disability Law and Its
Implications for Legal Education, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 857, 875 (2010) (citing Michael L. Perlin, Fatal
Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM.
BEHAv. 39, 57 n.l 15 (1992)).
229. Terry Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1485, 1492
(2011).
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judges to focus on information that confirms their preconceptions
(i.e., confirmation bias), to recall vivid and emotionally charged
aspects of cases (i.e., the availability heuristic), and to interpret
information that reinforces the status quo as legitimate (i.e., system
justification biases). 3 0
How does this play out in the context of sex offenders? Writing about
how mental disability is perceived in the legal profession, one of the authors
(MLP) has said:
Judges and jurors, both consciously and unconsciously, often rely on
reductionist, prejudice-driven stereotypes in their decision-making,
thus subordinating statutory and case law standards as well as the
legitimate interests of the mentally disabled persons who are the
subject of the litigation. Judges' predispositions to employ the same
sorts of heuristics as do expert witnesses further contaminate the
process.23 '
We believe that the same sort of "contaminat[ion]"2 3 2 takes place in the
sex-offender arena as well.
V. A FUTURE DESIGNED THROUGH KNOWLEDGE, THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE, AND THE UNIVERSAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN DIGNITY
AND RIGHTS
Eight years ago, Dr. Astrid Birgden suggested that therapeutic
jurisprudence, with its emphasis on increasing therapeutic effects and
decreasing anti-therapeutic consequences of the law, might provide the
necessary framework to ensure community and offender protection. 23 3 Her
suggestions to create an effective system focused on the collaboration of
efforts between legal practitioners, correctional practitioners and the court
system.23 4 A psycho-legal approach can be successful in addressing sex-
offender assessment (risk and need principles), treatment (need and internal
responsivity principles), and management (external responsivity principles)
so long as the focus rests on both community and offender protection. 23 5 In
230. Eden B. King, Discrimination in the 21st Century: Are Science and the Law Aligned?, 17
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 54, 58 (2011) (citing Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and
Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A
Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973); John T. Jost &
Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Role of Stereotyping in System-Justification and the Production of False
Consciousness, 33 BRIT. J. SOc. PSYCHOL. 1 (1994)).
231. Michael L. Perlin, "Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror ": The Legal Profession's Willful and Sanist
Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Disabilities, 69 U. Prrr. L. REV. 589, 602-03 (2008).
232. Id.
233. Birgden, supra note 207, at 362.
234. Id. at 359.
235. Id. at 353.
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the courtroom setting, correctional practitioners can advise the court on
offender rehabilitation techniques (offender protection) while legal
practitioners maintain an environment that assists offenders in engaging in
treatment (community protection).23 6 In the corrections setting, legal
practitioners can provide advice on ethical treatment (offender protection)
while correctional practitioners can increase the courts' confidence in
rehabilitation (community protection). 237
Clearly, we must focus our efforts and resources on reintegration into
society, rather than removal and alienation. Sex-offender civil commitment
is not going by the wayside, and, following the recent Supreme Court
decision upholding federal civil commitment in United States v.
Comstock,23 8 it may gain more support. 239 Given the limited effectiveness
and knowledge of treatment combined with the lengthy and indefinite time
spent in sex-offender civil commitment, 240 states should re-allot their
resources and focus on fostering rehabilitation and reintegration into the
community. If we continue to support civil commitment under the guise of
treatment and the hope that individuals can be treated, then ethically, we
must tailor treatment to assist in re-entering society. 24' Focus should follow
TJ ideals and aim to promote sex offenders' self-respect and dignity, while
teaching these individuals to engage in emotionally intimate relationships
with others.242 Preparation for release should include job training, education
and life skills.24 3 We must support the transition back into the community by
236. Birgden, supra note 207, at 357-58.
237. Bill Glaser, Treaters or Punishers? The Ethical Role of Mental Health Clinicians in Sex
Offender Programs, 14 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAv. 248, 250 (2009).
238. 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1961 (2010)(finding that Congress has the authority to create federal civil
commitment legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause because it is a "federal custodian" with
"the constitutional power to act in order to protect nearby (and other) communities from the danger
federal prisoners may pose").
239. Brief for the States of Kansas et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petioners at 1, United States.
v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (No. 08-1224), 2009 WL 2896311 (explaining that in 1990 only
one state had enacted sex offender commitment laws but by 2010 at least 21 states had such laws).
240. Eric S. Janus, The Preventative State, Terrorists, and Sexual Predators: Countering the Threat
ofa New Outsider Jurisprudence, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 576, 580-81 (2004).
241. Wakefield, supra note 4, at 146 ("The SVP laws were passed with the promise of rehabilitation
as a major goal. Confinement would be limited because treatment would be provided and the 'patients'
would be released as soon as they were no longer dangerous or mentally disordered. But in reality,
committed sex offenders are rarely discharged. The primary purpose of these laws is incapacitation-to
prevent future sexual violence by direct physical constraint. Treatment is only an additional purpose. In
reality, punishment, isolation, and incapacitation are the dominant purposes. La Fond [sic] observes that
in some states, there was no bona fide treatment program in place when the individuals were
committed.") (citations omitted); see also John Q. La Fond, The Future of Involuntary Civil
Commitment in the U.S.A. after Kansas v. Hendricks, 18 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 153, 163 (2000) (discussing
the need for treatment programs to serve a therapeutic purpose).
242. See Prentky & Schwartz, supra note 54, at 10 ("The most important point, however is that the
overarching goal of reducing sexual violence in society must rest squarely with the forces within society that
promote and foster sexual violence. By merely reducing the risk of those who have already tumed to sexual
violence, we will never achieve the ultimate aim of making society a safer place by restoring the rights to
sexual autonomy for women and children.") (emphasis added).
243. See Kathryn C. Sammon, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Examination of Problem-Solving
Justice in New York, 23 ST. JOHN'S J. C.R. & EcoN. DEv. 923, 926 (2008) (noting that problem-solving
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fostering family and community relationships.
Certainly, the authors are not so nalve as to believe that this will benefit
every type of person who commits sexual offenses; rather, we conclude that
the suggestions offered here, for reintegration, must be the main focus and
starting point of any coherent policy, in order to maximize success.
Residency restrictions should be completely dismantled due to their
anti-therapeutic effect and unfounded ability to have any impact on
diminishing re-offense and making communities safer. If we choose to
continue still have some form of community monitoring, it must be done
through an individualized assessment of risk, likelihood, and danger based
on credible, peer-reviewed studies and ethical evaluations. We should
encourage and reward efforts to engage in community service and
acknowledge former offenders' genuine attempts to live offense-free and
contribute to society. To quote the late Professor Bruce Winick, "[m]odern-
day sex offenders should also be offered the possibility of redemption." 2 4
"Feel-good" legislation should be abolished insofar as it serves no other
purpose but to humiliate, label, and dehumanize the individual.
In the courtroom context, we need to think more seriously about the
role of problem-solving courts in dealing with this phenomenon and how, if
properly conceived of and conducted, such courts can be the best assurance
that TJ will be an important and integral part of the decision-making
process.245 TJ can potentially re-educate judges to aid them in "identify[ing]
alternatives to harsh punishments . . . particularly since the punitive
response often leads to recidivism in most cases." 24 6
TJ instructs us to step back from myths and prevailing attitudes and to
carefully consider the prescriptions of therapeutic jurisprudence
principles. 247 Recall the "three Vs"-voice, validation and voluntary
participation-that Professor Amy Ronner has discussed. 248 The current
sex-offender laws honor none of these prescriptions. It is time we seriously
re-evaluated them all. We must educate ourselves, confront our fears, and
resist the urge to succumb to reactionary responses. These emotionally
charged issues must be dealt with through rational solutions directed
courts employing TJ seek to increase availability ofjob training, adult education, and anger management
in keeping with therapeutic jurisprudence principles).
244. Winick, supra note 13, at 567.
245. See, e.g., Emily Horowitz, Growing Media and Legal Attention to Sex Offenders: More Safety
or More Injustice?, J. INST. JUST. & INT'L STUD. 143, 154 (2007) ("[Ajlternative policy options include
specialized sex offender re-entry courts, which can evaluate risk, manage treatment, and closely monitor
sex offenders upon release. These courts are significantly cheaper than inpatient psychiatric facilities.")
(citations omitted); see also, La Fond & Winick, supra note 212, at 1174 (noting that sex-offender
courts-which are based on Ti principles--offer improved community protection and sex-offender
rehabilitation over traditional methods).
246. Brian G. Sellers & Bruce A. Arrigo, Adolescent Transfer, Developmental Maturity, and
Adjudicative Competence: An Ethical and Justice Policy Inquiry, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 435,
480 (2009).
247. Birgden, supra note 207, at 354; Birgden & Cucolo, supra note 59, at 306; Winick, supra note
13, at 507-08.
248. Ronner, supra note 196, at 94-95.
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towards protecting potential victims while preserving the human rights of
all. 249
249. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 91, at 12 ("Reforming sex offender laws will not be easy.
At a time when national polls indicate that Americans fear sex offenders more than terrorists, legislators
will have to show they have the intelligence and courage to create a society that is safe yet still protects
the human rights of everyone.").
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